

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Combating Terrorism in Central Asia: Explaining Differences in States' Responses to Terror

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This work examines differences in the level of violence of counterterrorism measures adopted by Central Asian states. Why do some Central Asian governments opt for wanton repression in the name of the struggle with terrorism, while others adopt less severe methods of control and prevention? To answer this question, this study draws on a synthesis of rationalist and constructivist explanations. Like rationalists, it posits that the magnitude of terrorism and states' material capabilities affect governments' responses to terrorism. Following constructivists, the study stresses the impact of ideas about the nature of terrorist threats and views on the appropriateness of the use of force on the counterterrorism policies of Central Asian states.

Keywords Central Asia, counterterrorism, terrorism

Governments challenged by the threat of terrorism respond to terrorist acts in different ways. Some states go to extremes to root out terrorism, using widespread repression not only of terrorists but of innocent civilians as well, while others rely on less severe mechanisms of control and prevention. What explains this variation?

This inquiry focuses on the counterterrorism responses of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. After the collapse of the USSR, political elites of these Central Asian states instituted openly non-democratic regimes variously labeled as "authoritarian presidentialism," "neopatrimonial regimes," or "personal dictatorships."[1] The differences in the extent of repression committed by these non-democratic states in the name of the struggle with terrorism constitute an interesting empirical puzzle.

To explain the puzzling differences in the level of repression used by the Central Asian governments in the context of struggle with terrorism, this study uses a combination of Rationalist and Constructivist explanations of state behavior. It posits that the incidents of political violence and terrorism in the region and the states' material capabilities are important, albeit insufficient, determinants of the states' counterterrorism measures. Ideas about the nature of terrorist threats and appropriate responses to it also influence governments' interpretations of political violence and subsequent reactions to it. This study examines historical and social contexts that have given rise to particular meanings of the terrorist threat in Central Asia and ideas about effective and acceptable responses to political violence.

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The sample of the selected cases is well-suited for systematic comparisons. One of the criticisms of small-n comparative designs is that they try to account for too many variables using too few cases, thus producing findings that lack internal validity.[2] If case studies isolate and test the impact of a few variables, they are criticized for not accounting for other ''extraneous'' factors that may influence the outcome in question. The large-n studies control for those ''extraneous'' effects statistically. This study ''controls'' for confounds by selecting cases that evince many institutional and cultural similarities.

All Central Asian states share the history of domination by Tsarist and Soviet Russia. The outdated Communist-era political structures, predominance of political interests and ideology as defined by the central government, narrowly specialized dependent economies, and inefficient systems of resource management are the legacies of the Soviet regime.[3] Currently, all Central Asian states are subject to geopolitical competition, continuing influence and intervention of their ''past colonial and Soviet master, Russia,'' and mounting challenges of Islamic fundamentalism.[4] The majority of Central Asians belong to Hanafi Sunnism, the most tolerant and liberal school of thought of Sunni Islam. Being a Muslim in Central Asia is a part of the local identity. For many people it is defined by adherence to traditions and customs rather than strict observance of Islamic rituals.[5]

The least visited and studied ex-Soviet Central Asian republics have recently caught the attention of many world powers. The world cares about Central Asia for two reasons: the region's phenomenal deposits of oil and natural gas and its frontline position in the global fight against terrorism and organized crime. The United States has energy security, strategic, and commercial interests in the region. U.S. policy goals regarding Central Asian energy resources include the promotion of independence and stability of Central Asian states and their ties to the West, diversification of Western energy suppliers, and encouragement of the construction of East–West pipelines that do not transit Iran.[6] The ongoing instability in South and Southwest Asia and the war on terrorism necessitate an enduring U.S. military presence in Central Asia. Interests in the energy resources and security of the region have swept away any uncertainty about Central Asia's importance to the U.S. and the international system.

This study is composed of four sections. The first section defines counterterrorism and details counterterrorism policies of the Central Asian states. The second section lays out theory-based explanations of differences in the level of violence of counterterrorism responses followed by evaluation of empirical evidence in five case studies. Section three discusses the findings of case studies and draws attention to the dynamic of interaction of brutal counterterrorism measures and instances of political violence in the region. The overview of the study is presented in the final part.

The primary sources of data for this analysis are states' reports detailing their counterterrorism measures submitted to the Counter-Terrorism Committee (the CTC) of the United Nations,[7] the annual country reports on human rights practices of the U.S. Department of State,[8] and reports of international human rights organizations—Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch. The information on illegally detained, prosecuted, and executed individuals charged with the crime of terrorism contained in the reports has been verified through the analysis of news wires of the regional media using the Lexus-Nexus search engine and reports of the local human rights organizations (in Russian). Additionally, the legislative databases of Central Asian States were analyzed.[9]

Counterterrorism Policies of the Central Asian States

Counterterrorism is a multifaceted policy aimed at preventing and combating terrorism through a combination of political, legal, diplomatic, and security measures.[10] Analysts of counterterrorism typically characterize states as "soft-" or "hard-liners,"[11] or classify counterterrorism programs into the "war" or "criminal justice" models.[12] Common to these and similar typologies of counterterrorism is the idea that the degree of states' deviation from the rule of law and internationally protected human rights under the pretext of fighting with terrorism varies across states.

The governments of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan have adopted extensive counterterrorism programs and legislation to combat terrorism and religious extremism, criminalized terrorist activity, and terrorism-related acts. They have established counterterrorism institutions with almost identical functions and authority. The counterterrorism legislation of all Central Asian states reiterates principles of the rule of law and respect for human rights. Yet, all Central Asian governments have gone astray from the proclaimed standards. The extent of violation of human rights, liberties, and prerogatives of law varies across the states of the region (see Table 1).

The government of Uzbekistan has gone to extremes to liquidate radical Islamic groups blamed for a series of terrorist attacks in the state. Uzbek authorities have persecuted, hunted down, assaulted, and incarcerated Muslim fundamentalists.[13] Gradually, the government's repression has spread to moderate Islamic believers.[14] Uzbek courts have handed down harsh punishments for terrorism-related acts as well as for less serious activities, such as the dissemination of materials intended to undermine public order. The courts'; rulings have been based on the flimsiest of evidence of the defendants' guilt in the alleged crimes.[15] Unfair trials, systematic torture, and ill-treatment have become routine in Uzbekistan. Reported disappearances, death sentences, and executions have been a big concern of international human rights groups.[16] In the context of the "war on terrorism," the government has been using war-like means to chase, crackdown on, and eradicate Islamic militants. Scores of civilians have perished as a result of excessive force used by the Uzbek security forces during counterterrorism operations.

The government of Tajikistan has also been known for harsh prosecution of Islamic militants. During the course of a five-year Tajik civil war, governmental troops used indiscriminate fire in military operations against Islamists. The 1997 peace agreement brought fighting to an end and ensured representation of the Islamic Renaissance Party (IRP), which fought on the side of the opposition in governmental structures. However, the IRP's activities have been hampered by renewed persecution.[17] Tajik officials launched criminal investigations against former fighters on the grounds of various grave crimes, including terrorist acts, allegedly committed during the civil war. The IRP maintains that trials and sentencing are politically motivated to discredit the party.[18] Several years after the termination of fighting, the government continued using war-like means to liquidate the remnants of the armed militants whom the governments labeled "terrorists," "bandits," and "gangsters." During the retaliatory attacks launched by government forces in the summer of 2001, dozens of locals lost their houses, livestock, and lives.[19] Members of radical Islamic groups have also been subjected to intense surveillance and prosecution. Local monitors and journalists allege that defendants charged with participation in or support of the activities of Hizb ut-Tahrir, an extremist Islamic political

Table 1. Counterterrorism policies of the Central Asian states

	Uzbekistan	Tajikistan	Turkmenistan	Kazakhstan	Kyrgyzstan
Legislative Framework	*Program of Measures to Strengthen Efforts to Combat Reactionary Extremism and Terrorism* (2000); Act *On Combating Terrorism* (2000)	*Program for Intensifying Efforts to Combat Terrorism* for the period 1998–2000 (1997); Act *On Combating Terrorism* (1999)	Act *On Combating Terrorism* (2003)	Act *On Measures to Combat Terrorism* (1999); *Program for Combating Terrorism and Other Forms of Extremism and Separatism* (2000)	Act *On Combating Terrorism* (1999); *State Program for Combating Terrorism and Other Forms of Extremism and Separatism* (2000)
Institutions Responsible for Counterterrorism	National Security Service; Ministries of Internal Affairs, Defense and Emergency Situations; and Committees on the Protection of State Border and Customs	Ministries of Security, Internal Affairs, Defense and Emergencies; Committee on the Protection of State Border; and Presidential Guard	Ministries of National Security, Internal Affairs and Defense; Security Service of the President; and State Border and Customs Services	National Security Committee; Ministries of Internal Affairs and Defense; and Security Service of the President	National Security Service; Security Council; Ministries of Internal Affairs and Defense; Customs and Border Services; and Office of the Prosecutor-General
Courts' Penalties for Terrorism and Related Acts	20–25 years of imprisonment or death penalty; 10–25 years for less serious acts	5–25 years of imprisonment or death penalty; 1–18 years for less serious crimes	5 years to life imprisonment	4–18 years of imprisonment; 2–5 years for less serious acts	10–25 years in prison or death penalty; a fine or up to 8 years in prison for less serious acts
Counterterrorism Policy "Style"	Repressive and aggressive. Unfair trials, systematic torture, and ill-treatment of suspects.	Less repressive than in Uzbekistan. Intense surveillance and control. Use of excessive force.	Stern political control. Widespread repression following assassination attempt in 2002.	More balanced approach combining coercion and cooption, control and assimilation.	Lenient and tolerant policy in the1990s. Repression of radical Islamists since 1999.

organization banned in the state, had unfair trials and were abused and tortured in detention to extort confessions.[20]

Until recently, Turkmenistan lacked a distinct counterterrorism policy. Sweeping national security measures and stern political control compensated for the paucity of specific counterterrorism measures. The President of Turkmenistan, Saparmurat Niyazov, has personified the state, state power, state unity, and national legitimacy. Consequently, the national security of the Republic has been tantamount to the personal security of the President. To keep presidential powers intact, Niyazov's regime has blatantly subdued political and religious opponents and placed bans on political pluralism, religious diversity, or alternative expression.[21] After an alleged assassination attempt on the President in November 2002, which Niyazov survived unhurt, the government adopted counterterrorism legislation and created the State Commission on Fighting Terrorism and the Department for Counterterrorism and Organized Crime of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.[22] Along with the legislative and institutional changes, state authorities intensified oppressive measures and prosecution of Turkmen.[23] By accounts of international human rights groups, the criminal police arrested, tortured, and tried about 100 people in relation to the 2002 attack. All trials were closed to the public and conducted with blatant violations of due process. Among those prosecuted were relatives of the exiled political opposition.

The government of Kazakhstan also declared religious extremism as one of the threats to the national security of Kazakhstan, but chose a more balanced approach to stave off Islamic fundamentalism. It has combined coercion and subjugation of political freedoms with policies of cooption, control, and assimilation of Islamic forces and appeasement of the general public. In 2005, the Parliament of Kazakhstan toughened national religious legislation and adopted the law envisaging severe punishment for extremist activities and financial help to extremist and terrorist groups.[24] Under the pretext of prevention of terrorism and religious extremism, law enforcement authorities conducted inspections of religious organizations throughout the country and suspended a number of religious groups. In October of 2004, the Supreme Court of Kazakhstan issued a ruling in which it recognized Al Qaeda, the East Turkistan Islamic Party, the Kurdish People's Congress, and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan as terrorist organizations and prohibited them from any activity in the state. A half a year later, another Kazakh court banned activities of Hizb ut-Tahrir, pronouncing this group to be an extremist organization. In everyday life, however, there have been few arrests of Hizb ut-Tahrir activists and little repression of religious activists.[25] The legislation of Kazakhstan contains no provisions allowing convictions for the distribution of religious literature or following nontraditional Islamic practices.[26]

In the early 1990s, the Kyrgyz Republic served as an example of democratic development in post-Soviet Central Asia and was described as an "island of democracy" in a region with corrupt and repressive political leaders.[27] A "softer," more tolerant, and conciliatory response towards activities of Hizb ut-Tahrir used to set Kyrgyzstan apart from its more fierce neighbors. A spokesperson for the Interior Ministry of Kyrgyzstan, Joldoshbek Busurmankulov, explained a difference in the republics' strategies:

> I don't think that we will live 20 years without any Hizb ut-Tahrir, if we give them [members of Hizb ut-Tahrir] 30 or 40 years of imprisonment or

> arrest all of them. It will not happen. I think we may fight by alternative ways, different methods. We should prove their destructiveness. We should fight for the hearts and minds of the people.[28]

The following example illustrates differences in the ways the Central Asian governments have responded to threats. At different times, the presidents of Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan were targets of assassination attempts. In Turkmenistan, the government responded with widespread repression of alleged partakers of the November 2002 attack. Turkmen authorities issued orders for the resettlement to remote desert regions of all "unworthy persons" living on the border with Uzbekistan. The government of Uzbekistan claimed that the bombings that exploded in Tashkent in February 1999 were an assassination attempt targeting President Karimov because the incident happened in front of a governmental building and at a time when Karimov was scheduled to arrive for a meeting of his cabinet.[29] A surge of arrests and trials followed the bombings. As a remarkable contrast appears the decision of Kyrgyz President Askar Akayev to pardon six people convicted of plotting to kill him in 1999. The offenders were sentenced to 14 to 16 years in prison on charges of preparation for a terrorist attack on Akayev and with an attempt to overthrow the country's constitutional system. First, a city court reduced the terms to four and six years on defenders' appeal, and a year later, all were pardoned by the President.

A series of incursions by Islamic militants and hostage-taking incidents in 1999–2000 spread fears of radical Islamists in the republic. Poorly prepared to fight off the raids of the guerilla force at the time of attacks, the government of Kyrgyzstan undertook a reform of the security forces and enhanced security measures in the aftermath of incursions. It also intensified and hardened its policies toward terrorism and religious extremism. Since 1999, active intelligence and counterintelligence efforts of Kyrgyzstan have been focused on the IMU, a militant Islamist group active in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and elsewhere in Central Asia. The government of Kyrgyzstan has also undertaken active steps to halt the spread of religious groups' literature and to track down members of the Hizb ut-Tahrir.[30] In April 2004, Kyrgyzstan added Hizb ut-Tahrir to the list of banned religious extremist groups. Although the followers of Hizb ut-Tahrir have not been implicated in violence in Kyrgyzstan, the government accuses the organization of "ideological terrorism" and hampers activities of human rights groups, which speak out against the persecution of Hizb ut-Tahrir members.[31]

The strategy of repression and violent crackdown has been systematically applied to suspected terrorists and their affiliates in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, although much less so in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. Turkmenistan's leadership has been using repressive means indiscriminately to suppress any opposition to the power of President. What can explain this variation in counterterrorism responses of the Central Asian states?

Explaining Differences in Counterterrorism Responses of Central Asian States: Theory and Case Studies

The current state of the literature on states' responses to terrorism is characterized by the lack of cross-sectional and longitudinal analyses of state violence in the name of the struggle with terrorism and a scarcity of explanations of states' counterterrorism

policies. Few empirical analyses have attempted to account for states' choices of different counterterrorism measures, and those that have relied on a narrow sample of liberal democracies.[32]

More general explanations of states' behavior can be inferred from two competing analytical paradigms, namely Rationalism and Constructivism.[33] Rationalist theories typically explain policy choices by reference to goal-seeking behavior. A state adopts a policy if the costs associated with enacting it do not exceed the expected benefits from its implementation.[34] Constructivists refute the central tenet of rationalist approaches that states pursue their exogenously determined interests according to the "logic of expected consequences."[35] Instead, in their explanations of states' policy choices, constructivists assume that states act as social actors whose interests and identities are shaped by commonly held ("intersubjective") ideas (norms, knowledge, culture, etc.).[36]

A widely held belief associating states' responses to terrorism with the intensity of terrorist attacks and states' capabilities to strike back is informed by the Rationalist conception of politics. Governments do what is believed to be in their best interest to do (i.e., to eliminate or minimize the threat of terrorism) given the availability of resources.

Constructivists note that states' interests cannot be taken out of an ideational context that gives them their meanings. What constitutes an interest or a threat can never be stated *a priori*; "it should be approached as a social construction and theorized at that level."[37] For constructivists, states' interests in fighting terrorism and choices of counterterrorism policies are defined by social norms and ideas about the nature of terrorist threats, and appropriate and legitimate responses to it.

The problems and shortcomings of Rationalism and Constructivism have been extensively discussed in the literature and need not be repeated here.[38] The corollary of the criticisms is that none of the perspectives can provide a full and adequate explanation of states' responses to terrorism, and their combination might be more productive. This study utilizes the tools of both approaches for providing a comprehensive account of the Central Asian states' counterterrorism policies. A synthesis of rationalist and constructivist perspectives is feasible when Rationalism and Constructivism are treated pragmatically as analytical tools or "styles of thought" to guide one through the analysis of state policies.[39]

As with rationalists, this study posits that the magnitude of terrorist attacks will affect states' security measures. The size of states' material capabilities—security forces, financial resources, etc.—will limit the range of their policy options. Given the availability of resources, the intensity of states' responses to terrorism should be positively related to the number and deadliness of terrorist attacks.

Following constructivists, this article assumes that the facts of political life do not reflect an objective reality, but depend on interpretations of actors experiencing them. Acts of political violence, for example, will be imbued with particular meanings depending on a common understanding of what constitutes a threat. The extent of application of a state's capabilities will be bound by a general understanding of appropriateness and acceptability of the use of force. Meanings and knowledge, in and of themselves, are highly malleable products of historical and social processes.[40]

Due to historical circumstances, the governments of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan came to believe that the threat of terrorism stems from activities of radical Islamic groups. Their views on the extent of the threat posed by radical Islam have varied depending on the circumstances of

introduction and practice of Islam in the societies of Central Asia. The difference exists between those ethnic groups whose nucleus was formed by settled populations and those who had recently been nomads.[41] Islam has played a more superficial and varied role on the territories of Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan, formally inhabited by nomads. The sedentary people of what is now Uzbekistan and Tajikistan adopted Islam as their main religion much earlier and have observed Islamic prohibitions and laws more closely. The differences in the way the settled and itinerant populations practiced Islam translated in the varied role of religion among the contemporary republics of Central Asia. Uzbekistan and Tajikistan have experienced greater Islamisization than Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, where traditionally less strict adherence to orthopraxis and orthodoxy of Islam prevented it from taking deep roots.[42] The latter factor has affected the Central Asian governments' views on the extent of threats posed by radical Islam.

Furthermore, constructivists consider states as social actors whose actions express collective as well as individual intentionality. The various organizations and institutions to which states belong affect their understanding of problems and their choices of policy options. It can be expected, then, that ideas about the acceptability of the use of force and expectations of other states conveyed in the language of international norms and diplomatic statements will also influence counterterrorism policies of the Central Asian republics.[43]

To summarize, deciding on measures to combat terrorism, governments will be driven by their interest in minimizing threats to state security and constrained by the availability of resources. Governments' interpretations of the threat will be shaped by ideas about who terrorists are and how much threat they pose. In Central Asia, the understanding of the nature of terrorist threats has evolved as knowledge about the role of Islamic faith in the societies of Central Asia has evolved. Furthermore, views on the use of force held by Central Asian leaders and promoted in international discourse and norms will affect the governments' choices of measures to combat terrorism.

Uzbekistan

On 16 February 1999, six car bombs exploded in the downtown of the Uzbek capital, killing 16 people and injuring more than 120 others. Such an attack was unprecedented in the history of independent Uzbekistan. Official authorities contended that the members of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) orchestrated the blasts. The IMU is a militant Islamic organization designated as a terrorist group by a number of states. Its original aim was to establish an Islamic state in Uzbekistan in opposition to President Karimov's secular regime.[44] Later, the IMU expanded its goals and activities in an attempt to create a region-wide Islamic caliphate beginning in Uzbekistan and gradually extending into the rest of Central Asia.

The activities of radical Islamic groups have always alarmed the Uzbek government. It is believed that Uzbekistan with its deep Islamic tradition provides fertile ground for the cultivation of fundamentalism. The settled population that formed the Uzbek ethnos converted to Islam in the eighth century.[45] During the tenth and twelfth centuries, Samarkand, Bukhara, and other urban centers, mostly in present-day Uzbekistan, were the cradle of the Islamic renaissance in Central Asia.[46] Since then, Islam has become an indispensable part of the traditions, practices, and social structures of the Uzbeks.

After independence, the revival of Islamic religion in Uzbekistan represented an expression of interest in a foundational component of the "national heritage" of Uzbeks.[47] President Karimov attempted to harness religious sentiments to endorse legitimacy and ensure public support of his rule.[48] Public authorities have been creating and cultivating national ideology encompassing elements of Islamic religious doctrine, albeit an official interpretation of it. Some devout Muslims in Uzbekistan, the so-called Wahhabis, openly opposed Islamic rituals based on the officially permitted interpretations. The more radical Islamic groups supported by Saudi, Iranian, Pakistani, and Afghan Islamists, sought to establish an Islamic state governed by Islamic law.[49]

President Karimov has often expressed fears of this radical strain of Islam. He believes that radical Islamists and fundamentalists threaten to destabilize the state and undermine confidence in the state reformer.[50] In the early 1990s, the government cracked down on leaders of radical Islamic groups which openly criticized official Muslim administration or did not demonstrate explicit loyalty to the state. The February 1999 explosions exacerbated the government's fears of the threat of Islamism and provoked massive retaliation against people practicing Islam outside the state-run religious institutions.

Since then, the government has routinely accused Islamists, particularly the members of the IMU and Hizb ut-Tahrir,[51] in all incidents of political violence in Uzbekistan. Even the Andijan uprising of 13 May 2005 was blamed on Islamic "terrorists" and "fanatics" who sought to create disturbances in the region, topple the government, and establish an Islamic state.[52]

The Uzbek authorities possess all necessary resources for launching a massive crackdown on Islamic "enemies" of the state. Uzbekistan has the largest population in the region, significant natural resources, the strongest military power among the five Central Asian states, and sufficient police force. The government's beliefs about the acceptability of the use of force allowed law enforcement officials to put the state's capabilities in action. President Karimov was quoted as saying that strong executive power is necessary during certain periods of a state's development.[53] He has explicitly referred to the experiences of a powerful Central Asian ruler of the late fourteenth century, Amir Timur (Tamerlane). Timur's reign promoted the consolidation of Islam in the Central Asian region and Islam, in turn, was the basis on which Timur united his state.[54] President Karimov, too, has been using official Islam for consolidating and legitimizing his power, when necessary by forceful and oppressive means.

The relations of the Uzbek authorities with governments of other states have strengthened the conception of radical Islam as the main threat to the national security and political stability of Uzbekistan. The civil war in Tajikistan reinforced the Uzbek government's view on "the dangers of the power-sharing alliance" with Islamic fundamentalist groups, which the Uzbek authorities blamed for the war in Tajikistan. "We would not want a repeat of the chaos which exists in Tajikistan," stated Karimov.[55] He banned the creation of Islamic political parties and tightened up state security measures against Islamists.

The 9/11 attacks drew terrorism into sharp focus in the international community. Security Council resolution 1373 (2001) outlined various counterterrorism measures that are binding on states under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. This landmark document for the first time created uniform obligations for all members of the United Nations.[56] A notable fact is that, while obliging states to

adopt extensive counterterrorism measures, the resolution does not define terrorism.[57] In compliance with international counterterrorism norms and resolutions of the Security Council, all Central Asian republics toughened domestic criminal legislation and fortified counterterrorism measures that included the strengthening of domestic regulations of religious and political freedoms.

Relations of the Central Asian governments with the United States were an important factor in the formulation and implementation of counterterrorism policies in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. The designation of the IMU as a terrorist organization and a branch of Al Qaeda by the U.S. Department of State[58] reinforced the determination of the Uzbek leaders, as well as of the Tajik and Kyrgyz governments, in apprehending and liquidating members and supporters of this militant organization. Following the decision of Uzbekistan to lend its Khanabad military airbase for staging military and logistic operations of American troops in the Afghan campaign, the government of the U.S. rewarded Uzbekistan with sharply increased military and economic aid.[59]

American assistance to Uzbekistan has been conditioned by "substantial and continuing" progress in the areas of human rights and the promotion of democracy. Many observers believed that until the events surrounding the Andijan uprising of May 2005, the U.S. had not fully utilized its leverage to influence the human rights practices of Karimov's government.[60] After the U.S. government introduced economic and political sanctions against the Tashkent authorities in 2005, and even threatened to institute proceedings against Karimov in the International Court following the brutal suppression of public unrest in Andijan, Uzbekistan ordered the U.S. to leave the Khanabad military base. NATO allies, too, were prohibited from using Uzbek territory and airspace for their operations in Afghanistan.[61] International media outlets and foreign non-governmental organizations were ordered to discontinue their activities and to leave Uzbekistan.

Tajikistan

Tajikistan has probably taken the brunt of political violence, religious extremism, and terrorism in the region. By different estimates, 60,000 to 100,000 people perished in the Tajik civil war (1992–1997). Much of the conflict stemmed from aggravated regional differences and fights over resources. Yet, the dispute over the role of Islam in state-building contributed to the outbreak of fighting.[62] The hostage-taking, assassinations, and other crimes committed by the renegade fighters, who refused to disarm under the terms of the 1997 peace treaty, exacerbated the government's fears of radical Islam. Following the lead of the government of Uzbekistan, Tajik authorities began using the label of "terrorist" in reference to remaining anti-government armed groups. The threat of terrorism has also been invoked in reference to activities of an official Islamist party, the Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan.[63]

The government's views on the extent of the threat posed by Islamists have been shaped by an understanding of a significant role that Islam has played in the lives of Tajik citizens. Islam has become a substantial and organic part of the culture and history of the Tajik people since its introduction in the second half of the seventh century. During the years of *perestroika*, radical Islamists, who existed in small numbers in the territory of the Tajik Soviet Republic (as well as in other parts of the USSR), were able to traverse the path from small informal groupings to mass meetings and the creation of Islamic political organizations.[64] The prevalence of Islamic

values in the minds and hearts of the Tajiks was an important factor contributing to this swift transformation.

The fear of the popularity of Islam among the Tajiks prompted the sharp government's opposition to the creation of the Islamic Renaissance Party (IRP) in 1990,[65] notwithstanding its very moderate political platform.[66] Supported by the official Tajik clergy, the IRP received official registration in November 1991. However, the government took all necessary measures to prevent a candidate nominated by the opposition bloc uniting democrats and Islamists to win the 1991 presidential elections.[67]

The 1997 peace agreement ended the war and legalized the IRP, banned in 1993 at the onset of fighting. It also formalized a 30 percent quota of positions in the executive branch to the United Tajik Opposition (UTO), an umbrella group led by the IRP.[68] However, IRP members received posts mostly at lower ranks and well below the established quota. The number of IRP representatives in government structures dropped further after law enforcement officers began prosecuting former members of the UTO.[69]

The Tajik government continues to view Islamism as one of the main threats to national security despite the all-time low public support for the IRP and radical Islamic groups that are believed to be responsible for fomenting violence in the country. Although the IRP has adopted a somewhat conformist position with regard to the government, the latter repeatedly accuses the party in its propaganda of "extremism."[70]

The recent history of bloody war has had an impact on the Tajik government's responses to the threat of terrorism and religious extremism. It is well-known that governments tend to use past decisions as a baseline for current policy choices.[71] The peace agreement of 1997 brought the *de jure* end to the civil war; yet, the government of Tajikistan continued to rely on war-like tactics for fending off security risks to the state. The government has prolonged its military operations against the rebel fighters and has been known for using indiscriminate fire in killing and injuring civilians. Government-led military units and law enforcement agencies have been reported extorting, kidnapping, beating, torturing, looting, and inflicting wanton violence against civilians.[72]

The policies of other states have also affected the counterterrorism measures of Tajikistan. Tajik security officials and local human rights activists tend to agree that pressure from the Uzbek government on President Emamoli Rakhmonov has led to harsher responses to fundamentalism in the republic. As one of the security officers put it, "If Rakhmonov doesn't clamp down on Hizb ut-Tahrir, what will Karimov say to him?"[73] Some regional specialists maintain that Uzbekistan, in collaboration with the government of Russia, contributed to the start of war in 1992 in order to "demonstrate the seriousness of the threat of Islamic extremism" in the region.[74]

In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, Tajikistan declared itself a stalwart supporter of the international coalition for the fight against terrorism. It intensified its effort in combating religious extremism and terrorism. Some observers claim that the government of Tajikistan has been using the "war on terrorism" as a pretext for settling scores with former civil war opponents.[75] Following the lead of other Central Asian states, Tajikistan announced that Hizb ut-Tahrir has had contacts with Al Qaeda and the Taliban and declared the group as a major security threat in 2002.[76]

Turkmenistan

During the first decade of independence, Turkmenistan experienced a stable, albeit politically repressive existence. It ended unexpectedly on 25 November 2002, when a gunman fired at a motorcade carrying Turkmen President Niyazov, killing his cortege and wounding the President's escort. The leadership of Turkmenistan believes that this sole "terrorist" attack carried out in the state was masterminded abroad by former high-ranking governmental officials who had left the country since 1999 and established a new opposition group, the National-Democratic Movement of Turkmenistan.[77]

Radical Islam failed to emerge as a significant opposition force to the leadership of Saparmurat Niyazov, who eliminated all groups contesting his power during the early years of Turkmenistan's independence. The government deported religious activists who were not citizens of Turkmenistan. It strengthened regulations of Islamic religion and practices by introducing censorship of religious printed material and audio-production, and by establishing strict police surveillance over the department of theology at Ashgabad University, the only institution allowed to teach Islamic studies. The Shiite community was also denied registration.[78] Today, Islam remains under strict governmental control and non-traditional religions are blatantly suppressed.

These harsh means of social control might have obstructed activities of radical Islamic groups in Turkmenistan. However, the suppression of religious and political freedoms does not provide a complete explanation as to why Islamists have been unable to find inroads into Turkmen society. The repressive policies of neighboring states have failed to prevent the spread of radical Islam. There are particular features of Islam in Turkmenistan that have mitigated the possibility of the development of radical forms of Islam on Turkmen soil. Islam was assimilated into the tribal culture of the Turkmen through the activities of the Sufi saints (the so-called "shaykhs") rather than through the "high" written Islamic tradition and institutions of sedentary culture. The Turkmen clannish and tribal social structures conditioned the impact of Islamic beliefs imported by Sufi missionaries. The centuries-old loyalties toward the nomadic tribes have softened the impact of Islam in Turkmenistan. The modern Turkmen continue to identify more with their tribal culture than with religion or nationality. The religious and social systems of Turkmen society have preserved tribal and ethnic loyalties, which, in turn, have effectively diluted the impact of radical Islam.[79]

These factors explain the Turkmen's general passivity toward Niyazov's peculiar adoption and adaptation of Islamic faith to his own ends. The president himself has assumed the role of a leader of Muslim people and created his own pseudo-religion glorifying his personality. He prepared a religious text, the Rukhnam, which is cited in mosques and religious schools along with passages from the Quran.[80] Niyazov has legalized religious observation and permitted the functioning of religious schools in the officially secular state.

The status of a neutral state helps Turkmenistan avoid entering undesirable treaties and alliances, thus protecting it from the interference of Western states. The government of Niyazov has been fond of its ties with authoritarian China and Iran, which similarly deplore Western practices of intervention on human rights matters. The policy of non-involvement in the internal affairs of the small and inaccessible republic has contributed to the strengthening of power by President

Niyazov. Niyazov has not been concerned with serious consequences from the American government, which is interested in natural gas and oil that it does not want to transport through Iran. The international community has had little interest in a state that does not threaten the security of its neighbors and reveals no attempts at enforcing its political style abroad.[81]

Kazakhstan

Kazakhstan has never been attacked by Islamic militants, nor has it suffered from deadly terrorist violence. On 22 April 2002, Kazakh security forces detonated a bomb hidden on the side of a road used by President Nazarbayev, thus preventing the only terrorist attack deemed to have targeted the government. Another explosion that occurred in November 2004 near the office of Kazakhstan's ruling party injured one passer-by. Kazakh officials downplayed the incident.[82]

Untouched by political instability inspired by Islamists, Kazakh authorities have never regarded radical Islam as the principal threat to national security. Yet, the government of Kazakhstan considers Islamic fundamentalism to be a destabilizing factor in the region. Kazakh officials and experts also believe that constraints on "using" Islam are much stronger in Kazakhstan than in any other Central Asian state. In 1994, some 47 percent of the population of Kazakhstan was Muslim, 44 percent was Russian Orthodox, and 2 percent was Protestant.[83] The relatively small Muslim population rendered insufficient social basis for mobilization by Islamic groups. The majority of those identifying with Islamic creed are rather light observers of Islamic prohibitions and laws.[84] Although Islam spread in the lands of nomadic tribes in the ninth and tenth centuries, it has never had such a prevailing influence among the Kazakh nomads as among the Uzbeks and Tajiks.[85]

Furthermore, Kazakhstan has a big Russian population, which constitutes a strong bloc of support for President Nazarbayev.[86] Nazarbayev has been reluctant to identify his state too closely with Islamic causes, presenting his nation as a bridge between the Islamic East and the Christian West.[87]

In the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks, the rhetoric of Islamic danger has become very common. It led the Kazakh government to reassess the potential of radical Islam to disrupt the country's stability. There have been reports of the rise of support for Hizb ut-Tahrir in the south of the country, and some Kazakh officials have expressed fears of Islamists.[88] The suicide bombings that exploded in the capital of Uzbekistan in July 2004 caused security concerns to soar in Kazakhstan.[89] Following the general crackdown on Islam in the region, Kazakh authorities beefed up prosecution of religious extremist groups.

As the wealthiest and the most economically advanced nation of the region, Kazakhstan has all the necessary resources to crack down on the leading critics of opposition and to stifle any manifestation of radical Islam. Kazakhstan, as well as other Central Asian states, has received significant military assistance from the U.S., which has allowed the Kazakh government to upgrade its arms arsenals, enhance military training programs, and to acquire equipment to prevent and respond to terrorist incidents.[90]

Constraints on the "use" of dictatorial power have also been much higher in Kazakhstan than in neighboring states. The business elite represent a strong opposition block to Nazarbayev's government. Kazakhstan, as well as Kyrgyzstan, has a relatively advanced civil society. President Nazarbayev himself understands that,

without necessary political institutions, his government would be unable to attract foreign investments and sell Kazakhstan's natural reaches in the world markets.[91] Furthermore, Nazarbayev asserts that his principles of governance reflect the values of the society he rules. One of the often-stated values of the Kazakh people is their openness and tolerance. The Kazakhs often stress that their nomadic past has contributed to a greater receptiveness of external influences and adaptability of their culture.[92] It can be surmised that these values of openness and tolerance also have had a bearing on the government's policy choices.

Kyrgyzstan

A former member of the IMU once alleged that Kyrgyzstan "has the most favorable conditions to carry out terrorist attacks."[93] Indeed, the majority of terrorist acts and Islamic incursions took place in the territory of Kyrgyzstan and its neighbor, Tajikistan. Yet, until recently, the Kyrgyz government avoided carrying out a serious crackdown on individuals and groups suspected of posing a threat to state security. It is possible that Kyrgyzstan has lacked the capability for carrying out mass arrests of terrorist suspects or raiding communities suspected of harboring Islamic fighters. For instance, at the time of the IMU incursion in Kyrgyzstan in the summer of 1999, the Kyrgyz army was in no condition to undertake a protracted campaign in the mountains. Until 1999, state authorities had given little thought to having a military at all, because Russian border guards were protecting the Kyrgyz border. As economic conditions in the country worsened and the national budget shrank, military and police forces received even less attention.

On the other hand, Islam has always played a greater role in the social and political life of the sedentary Uzbek and Tajik Muslims than in the politics and communities of the Kyrgyz.[94] Ancient Kyrgyz society was based on a nomadic lifestyle and the Kyrgyz carried on many traditional tribal beliefs after their nominal conversion. In Kyrgyzstan, as in Kazakhstan, Islam has had cultural significance but little apparent impact on the everyday lives of most ethnic Kyrgyz, although there has been considerable regional variation.[95] The religious opposition in Kyrgyzstan was less politicized and had a narrower social base. Consequently, the government of Kyrgyzstan viewed it as a minor threat to state security. In an interview with a Russian newspaper, President Akaev put it straightforwardly, "If I don't have a real problem of religious extremism, why would I create an artificial one?"[96]

The 1999 raids of Islamic militants did not change the Kyrgyz government's views on the influence of Islam within the country. State authorities believed that terrorist threats originated from outside of the country. A quasi-official public position on the nature of terrorist threats that came through in the conversations with Kyrgyz officials was that terrorism had been inspired by an unnamed "black force" coming from "outside."[97] The perception of terrorism as an international threat, as well as limited national capabilities, led Kyrgyzstan to seek international help and active collaboration with different states and international organizations, including the UN, the OSCE, the Shanghai Cooperation organization, and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), among others.

Explaining their attitudes and responses to religions fundamentalism, the Kyrgyz leadership has often appealed to tolerance as an intrinsic trait of the Kyrgyz character. Askar Akaev, who had ruled the country until April 2005, declared that the principle of the non-use of force against the Kyrgyz people was an essential part of his

political credo.[98] In response to the Kyrgyz Procurator General who insisted on the ineffectiveness of light penalties given to those propagating extremist views,[99] President Akaev asserted, "Only ideas should be use to defeat ideas, not repression."[100] Under President Akaev, the Kyrgyz Parliament never amended the Kyrgyz penal code with harsher penalties for activities involving religious extremism.

The new government of President Bakiev has demonstrated a more resolute approach toward Islamists in the country. The first law signed by the new president was on counteracting extremist activity. The stretched definition of extremism provided in the law allows prosecuting activists of Hizb ut-Tahrir and other Islamic groups operating in the country for extremism.

According to experts, the Chinese and Uzbek authorities pressed the Kyrgyz government to adopt anti-extremist legislation.[101] The government of China has long been interested in establishing in Kyrgyzstan a legal basis for prosecuting the Uighurs. The latter are a Turkic-speaking people residing in the northwestern region of China, the majority of whom profess Islam. For years, Chinese authorities have been battling the Uighur separatist movement. The government of China has been exerting strong influence over the Central Asian states in dealing with Uighurs. Bowing to pressure from China, the government of Kyrgyzstan suppressed any support of the Uighurs. In a series of trials, which observers labeled as politically motivated, the Kyrgyz courts sentenced Uighur defendants for terrorist bombings and attempts to set up a branch of the Uighur separatist movement in Kyrgyzstan.[102]

Uzbekistan has long been a fervent critic of Kyrgyzstan's lenient approach to Islamism. On 12 April 2002, the governments of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan signed an agreement on joint action to fight terrorism, as well as political and religious extremism. This agreement laid juridical grounds to demand from the Kyrgyz government that it take decisive steps in preventing the recruitment of individuals for terrorist activities in other states. The Kyrgyz courts outlawed activities of religious organizations banned in Uzbekistan. The Kyrgyz government has not blocked the Uzbek secret service's activities in the country, including occasional abductions and forced repatriation of Islamic activists. The liquidation of a prominent ethnic Uzbek religious leader, R. O. Kamoluddin, in a joint raid of the Uzbek–Kyrgyz security forces on 6 August 2006, became an apex of anti-terrorism cooperation of Kyrgyzstan with Uzbekistan.[103]

Discussion

Authoritarianism is a long-standing Central Asian tradition that has been preserved in all states in the region after their independence. Within this authoritarian context, the Central Asian governments chose different responses to terrorism associated with activities of radical Islamic groups in the region. Uzbekistan has applied the most repressive counterterrorism measures targeting Islamic activists. Similarly, Tajikistan took a very tough stance against radical Islamists. In Turkmenistan, President Niyazov has tightened his grip over both religious and political activities. Both Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan have utilized less repressive counterterrorism policies.

An untested assumption favored in academic, political, and media circles is that states' responses to terrorism match the intensity of terrorist attacks and material capabilities of states. Neither Turkmenistan nor Kazakhstan suffered from deadly terrorist violence; yet, the governments of both states endorsed vigorous counterterrorism measures. Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan have taken the brunt of terrorism and

Islamic incursions in the region. However, it is Uzbekistan that has systematically applied the most appalling methods of combating terrorism. The counterterrorism responses of the richest states of the region, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, and those of the poorest nations, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, differ as well.

To explain the puzzling differences in states' responses to terrorism, this study relied on a synthesis of Rationalist and Constructivist explanations of state behavior. It posited that the intensity of terrorist attacks, as well as states' capabilities to combat terrorism, would affect the brutality of states' counterterrorism policies. It also assumed that governments' interpretations of and reactions to terrorist acts would always be context-dependent; that is, domestic and international ideational contexts would provide a frame of reference for states' interpretations of and reactions to political acts.

The evidence examined in the case studies largely supports the stated propositions. The terrorist attacks and Islamists' incursions demonstrated that terrorist groups, like the IMU, operate out of the region and pose a threat to the stability of Central Asia. The incidents of terrorism and armed clashes with Islamic fighters sparked off retaliatory responses by the governments of Central Asian states.

Nonetheless, the mere facts of Islamists' attacks and the damage inflicted by terrorist violence are insufficient for gauging the extent of a threat of radical Islam in Central Asia. Recently, in all Central Asian republics, radical and militant Islam has been in retreat. The toppling of the Taliban regime and the destruction of Al Qaeda strongholds in Afghanistan severely weakened the IMU. Other radical groups, like Hizb ut-Hahrir, have enjoyed insignificant public support. Radical ideas about the establishment of an Islamic state have been alien to the majority of Central Asians. Islamism and religious fundamentalism have become associated with the threat of civil war and instability. Many people in Central Asia, even in the traditional centers of Islamic piety, have developed distrust and hostility toward radical Islamic groups. The threat of resurgence of the militant movement and the radicalization of the population continues to exist. However, there are good reasons, which are corroborated in field studies, to assume that radical Islamic groups have limited capabilities in the region.[104]

In spite of this, Central Asian officials, particularly those in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, claim that the IMU still poses a major threat to their countries and that support for radical Islamic groups has been on the rise across the region. To understand the views of the Central Asian governments on the extent of the threat of Islamism, this study examined historical and social circumstances of the introduction and practice of Islam by Central Asian societies.

Islam is a religion of settled people, as it requires a developed urban infrastructure for institutionalized Muslim practices. Naturally, the wide steppes populated with itinerant tribes provided poor soil for Islam, and the nomadic culture was much more difficult to convert.[105] Islam has had a less profound influence on the culture and politics of the descendants of nomads living in the steppes of Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan than on the social and political life of the sedentary Uzbek and Tajik Muslims.[106] The governments of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan have always viewed radical Islam as a greater challenge to their secular regimes than the public authorities of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkmenistan. The Uzbek and Tajik officials feared that radical Islamic groups were capable of gaining enough public support to imperil the governing regimes, absent a massive government crackdown.

Also, in Uzbekistan, the belief about the effectiveness and inevitability of tough measures at certain stages of national development affected the government's choices of repressive counterterrorism policies. In Tajikistan, a heavy hand of the history of violence directed the government to violent counterterrorism responses after the end of the Tajik civil war. In contrast, the leaders of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan have invoked the values of tolerance and openness, which the Kazakh and Kyrgyz societies traced to their nomadic past, to explain their more accommodating approach to radical Islamic groups.

The contacts of Central Asian states with each other, as well as with other states of the world, have influenced their governments' views on the problem of terrorism in the region. Bowing to political pressure from more powerful neighbors, all Central Asian governments strengthened their measures against terrorists, religious extremists, and Islamists. Influenced by the government of President Karimov, the Kyrgyz authorities significantly increased security measures against the followers of Hizb ut-Tahrir who have sought refuge in Kyrgyzstan. Tajik officials stepped up prosecution of the former UTO fighters and, under political pressure from China, all Central Asian republics intensified oppressive measures against the Uighur minority. Moscow also exploited the fears of religions extremism and terrorism in the region to revitalize the CIS collective security system, to bolster its ties with the Central Asian states in the military sphere, and to fight Islamic extremists.[107] Cooperation of the Central Asian governments with Russia, China, and the U.S. attracted significant material rewards and enhanced the status of the region in world politics.

The influence of the other states cannot be understood apart from discourse and the social norms that enabled possibilities for certain types of responses to terrorism. The speeches and statements of regional and world leaders, news reports, and scholarly publications have repeatedly stressed the danger arising from activities of Islamists in Central Asia. Particularly after the 9/11 attacks and the inception of the global "war on terror," the mentioning of the growth of Islamic sentiments has been accompanied by the rhetoric of threat and danger. The governments of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan got caught in the discourse of the "war on terror," and were keen to demonstrate both their support of the global anti-terrorism coalition and their ability to cope with the new threat. Even the leaders of Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan began to treat all forms of political and social activity within Islam as manifestations of Islamic fundamentalism and a prelude to religious and political conflicts.

There is little doubt that all Central Asian governments have taken advantage of the novel context for their own interests: to put increasing pressure on democratic and religious opposition and to fortify power of the governing regimes.[108] In much of this, the international community has been passively complicit. Only international human rights organizations have put forward scathing criticism of the Central Asian governments' increasingly authoritarian styles. The governing elites, conscious of the strategic importance of their states, have exploited the context of the global "war on terrorism," as well as the fear of Islamic extremism, to justify and intensify their suppression of dissent, without much concern about international condemnation.[109] With their increasingly close relationships to the U.S. and heightened international profile, all governments appeared confident that derogations of human rights within their borders would have no diplomatic consequences.

An important pattern in the escalation of radical Islamic threats emerged from the analysis of case studies. The broad radicalization of Islamic groups seeking to

challenge the secular nature of the newly independent states was a response to the persecution and reprisals inflicted upon the early manifestation of political Islam by the governments of some Central Asian states. The iron-hand policies toward radical Islamic groups provoked a reciprocation of violence and the appearance of militant terrorist groups in the region.

The state leadership of Uzbekistan launched a full-fledged attack on the independent religious opposition in 1993. It initiated a series of mass arrests of independent clergy, set restrictions on independent Muslim practices, and staged "disappearances" of influential Islamic leaders. A series of assassinations of public officials that took place in the Uzbekistan sector of the Ferghana Valley in December 1997 was a reprisal for the disappearances of a number of respected imams. The state repression that followed the assassinations prompted the creation of the IMU. Those Islamists who escaped the 1992 crackdown on the radical Islamic groups became the leaders of the IMU.

The radicalization of Islamic movements on the eve of Tajik civil war was a consequence of the unwillingness of the Tajik authorities to integrate religious leaders into secularized institutions of the government.[110] The sluggish and partial implementation of the provisions of the 1997 peace agreement provided a continuing *raison d'etre* for the armed gangs formed by the former UTO's fighters.

An upsurge in the mass repression in Uzbekistan generated the exodus of Islamists into the neighboring republics. The intensification of suppression of religious and political opponents in those states then increased the popularity of extremist ideologies and groups. Set upon the background of worsening economic conditions and the plummeting legitimacy of the governing elites, those who were persecuted and repressed by the authorities enjoyed the greatest popularity among the peoples of Central Asia.[111]

The observed pattern of the escalation of religious dissent, which was a response to indiscriminate retaliatory responses, is largely consistent with the literature on the impact of state repression of public dissent. Rational choice approaches assume that state repression significantly increases costs for achieving dissidents' goals.[112] If a state responds with repression to violent behavior, it will prompt the dissidents to abandon violence. If the state represses non-violent dissent, the dissidents will escalate their behavior to violent forms of protest. Additionally, research has demonstrated that state repression may have an immediate deterrent effect. However, in the long run, it will generate a lagged stimulus for new protest activity.[113] The repression of radical, non-violent groups, like Hizb ut-Tahrir, and the prosecution of moderate Muslims practicing their faith outside of religious confines established by the Central Asian governments have been associated with the lagged escalation of violent behavior in the Central Asian region.

To avoid future instability, growth of extremist groups, and radicalization of the population, all Central Asian states need to re-examine their policies towards Islam. The governments have to introduce changes to their counterterrorism strategies, placing less emphasis on indiscriminate repression and retaliatory violent methods.[114] The implications of indiscriminate violence and the suppression of religious and political freedoms are steep. Violence creates violence.It raises doubts about the legitimacy of fighting terrorism as a global objective and turns people away from the democratic values championed by the leaders of the global anti-terrorism coalition.

Conclusion

The governments of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan have been determined to eliminate the threat of terrorism in the region. The states' public authorities have yielded to the exigencies of national security, as well as the political survival of the governments in power, and surrendered respect for human rights. Yet, the extent of the violence of counterterrorism responses has differed across the Central Asian republics. To explain this intriguing variation, this study relied on the tenets of Rationalism and Constructivism with regard to the impact of political violence, the ideas about the nature of terrorist threats, and the states' capabilities and views on the appropriateness of the use of force on the states' counterterrorism policies.

In all Central Asian states, the threat of terrorism became associated with activities of radical Islamic groups in the region. The Central Asian governments' understanding of security risks related to terrorism, religious extremism, and Islamism was contingent not only on the magnitude of political violence and terrorism in the region, but also on the circumstances of the introduction and practice of Islam in the societies of Central Asia.

Not only the states' capabilities to combat terrorism, but also the differing views on the acceptability of repressive policies, the varied role of violence, and the use of force have affected the scale of repression within the Central Asian republics. The contacts of Central Asian states with each other, as well as with other states of the world, have also influenced their governments' views on the problem of terrorism in the region.

This study has illuminated some areas for future research. First, it demonstrated how the international environment can influence the policies of newly independent states. It showed how international apathy can perpetuate and reinforce inhuman and unlawful practices in the states. It illustrated how the context of the "war on terrorism" can provide a golden opportunity for undemocratic regimes to curb domestic opposition. Further analysis is required to explore conditions under which international norms, expectations of other states, and international context affect foreign and domestic policies of states.

The case studies revealed that disproportionably stern governmental measures caused a backlash among the opposition movements. A future study should examine the question of a dynamic interaction between repressive counterterrorism policies and terrorism. The outbreaks of violence in the Central Asian states suggested that the strategy of governmental reprisals is failing and raised the question of whether draconian approaches can only exacerbate an already precarious situation. It has been argued that repressive responses by authorities are counterproductive and that those states with policies conforming to the goals and principles of the UN Charter are likely to be the ones least affected by terrorism.[115]

Notes

1. Shireen T. Hunter, *Islam in Russia: The Politics of Identity and Security* (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2004), xvii; Sally N. Cummings, "Introduction: Power and Change in Central Asia," in Sally N. Cummings, ed., *Power and Change in Central Asia* (Oxford, England: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2002).
2. Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba, *Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994).

3. Glenn E. Curtis, ed., *Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan: Country Studies* (Library of Congress Federal Research Division, 1996).

4. Richard H. Solomon, "Foreword," in Martha B. Olcott, ed., *Central Asia's New States: Independence, Foreign Policy, and Regional Security* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1996), ix.

5. International Crisis Group, "Central Asia: Islam and the State," ICG Asia Report #59 (Osh/Brussels, 10 July 2003), 5; Alexei V. Malashenko, "Islam Versus Communism: the Experience of Coexistence," in Dale F. Eickelman, ed., *Russia's Muslim Frontiers: New Directions in Cross-Cultural Analysis* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1993), 68; Vitaly V. Naumkin, "Militant Islam in Central Asia: The Case of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan," Berkeley Program in Soviet and Post Soviet Studies Working Paper Series (Spring 2003). http://repositories.cdlib.org/iseees/bps/2003_06-naum (accessed 1 May 2006), 16.

6. U.S. Interest in the Central Asian Republics. Hearing before the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific of the Committee on International Relations House of Representatives. 105th Congress, Second Session, 12 Feb. 1998. 48–119 CC. Available at http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/intlrel/hfa48119.000/hfa48119_0.HTM.

7. Available from the Counter-Terrorism Committee. http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/committees/1373/reports.html.

8. Country Reports on Human Rights Practices are available from the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department of State. http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/profiles.html.

9. The information on legislation is available from the Open Library (in Russian). http://lawlib.freenet.uz.laws/laws/html (accessed 1 Jul. 2005), and free Legal Database "LexInfoSys" (in Russian). http://www.cis-legal-reform.org/index.html (accessed 15 July 2005).

10. For the purpose of this paper I utilize RAND's definition of terrorism that is inclusive of the types of acts that the governments of Central Asian states consider as terrorist attacks. In short, terrorism is violence, or the threat of violence, committed with the purpose of the creation of an atmosphere of fear in order to coerce others into actions they would not otherwise undertake, or refrain from actions they desire to take. This violence or threat of violence is generally directed against civilian targets, but the motives of all terrorists are political (MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Database: Glossary. http://www.tkb.org/Glossary.jsp#T).

11. Taiji Miyaoka, "Terrorist Crisis Management in Japan: Historical Development and Changing Response (1979–1997)," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 10 (Summer 1998): 23–53; Paul Wilkinson, "Terrorism: International Dimensions," in William Gutteridge, ed., *The New Terrorism* (London: Mansell, 1986).

12. Ronald D. Crelinsten, "Terrorism, Counter-Terrorism and Democracy: The Assessment of National Security Threats," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 1, no. 2 (1989): 242–270; Ami Pedahzur and Magnus Ranstorp, "A Tertiary Model for Countering Terrorism in Liberal Democracies: The Case of Israel," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 13 (Summer 2001): 1–27.

13. The Uzbek authorities associate Islamic fundamentalism with Wahhabism. Wahhabism is a derogatory reference to the puritanical brand of Islam that rules Saudi Arabia. Despite the fact that the more radical believers of Islam in Central Asia were labeled Wahhabis, they have always denied any association with the Wahhabis of Saudi Arabia (Nancy Lubin and Barnett R. Rubin, *Calming the Ferghana Valley: Development and Dialogue in the Heart of Central Asia* (New York: The Century Foundation Press, 1999), 5). The Central Asian authorities tend to lump together Islamic fundamentalism and Islamism. For the purposes of this paper, I differentiate between the two. Islamism is used in reference to radical Islamic groups, mainly the Hizb ut-Tahrir or the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, which treat Islam as a political system governing every aspect of private, social, and political life in accordance with Islamic law and advocate the establishment of an Islamic state in Central Asia. Islamic fundamentalism refers to an Islam-based ideology that rejects secularization in Islam and Islamic countries and advocates the return to traditional, "pure" Islamic traditions, practices, and beliefs.

14. International Crisis Group (see note 5 above), 11.

15. Ibid. See also Zamira Eshanova, "Central Asia: Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan Differ in Approach to Hezb ut-Tahrir" (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 12 June 2002). http://www.rferl.org/nca/features/2002/07/12072002171856.asp (accessed 14 Apr. 2003).

16. Report of the Special Rapporteur on the question of torture E/CN.4/2003/68/Add.1 (27 Feb. 2003).

17. See, for example, Farangis Najibullah, "Central Asia: In Tajikistan and Elsewhere, Islamic Groups Still On the Fringe" (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 6 June 2003). http://www.rferl.org/nca/features/2003/06/06062003172224.asp (accessed 13 Mar. 2003).

18. Tajikistan: Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2004 (The Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, 28 Feb. 2005). http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2004/41712.htm (accessed 1 May 2006).

19. Human Rights Watch, World Report 2001. Tajikistan. http://www.hrw.org/wr2k1/europe/tajikistan.html (accessed 5 May 2005).

20. Ibid. See also Amnesty International, Annual Report 2005. Tajikistan. http://web.amnesty.org/report2005/tjk-summary-eng (accessed 5 May 2005).

21. Sally N. Cummings and Michael Ochs, "Turkmenistan: Saparmurat Niyazov's Inglorious Isolation," in Sally N. Cummings, ed., *Power and Change in Central Asia* (Oxford, England: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2002), 115.

22. Turkmenistan's report on counterterrorism policies S/2003/868 (9 Sep. 2003), submitted to the Counter-Terrorism Committee pursuant to Paragraph 6 of Security Council resolution 1373 (2001).

23. Human Rights Watch, "Turkmenistan: Human Rights Update" (14 May 2004). http://hrw.org/english/docs/2004/05/14/turkme8964.htm (accessed 4 Apr. 2005); Amnesty International, "Turkmenistan: Covering Events from January-December 2003" (2004). http://web.amnesty.org/report2004/tkm-summary-eng (accessed 10 Apr. 2005).

24. For an overview of amendments to religious legislation premised on the need to cope with the threat of religious extremism in Kazakhstan, see Igor Rotar, "Kazakhstan: Religious Freedom Survey, December 2005," *Forum 18 News Service* (Oslo, Norway: 8 Dec. 2005). http://www.forum18.org/Archive.php?article_id = 701 (accessed 1 May 2006).

25. International Crisis Group (see note 5 above), 33.

26. Ibid.

27. Erkinbek Kasybekov, "Government and Nonprofit Sector Relations in the Kyrgyz Republic," in M. Holt Ruffin and Daniel C. Waugh, eds., *Civil Society in Central Asia* (Center for Civil Society International, Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press, 1999), 71.

28. Zamira Eshanova (see note 15 above).

29. Gokalp Bayrmli, "Uzbekistan Bombing Allegations Raise Tensions With Turkey" (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty 8 Jul. 1999). Internet. http://www.rferl.org/nca/features/1999/07/F.RU.990708132919.html (accessed 1 March 2003).

30. Gulnoza Saidazimova, "Kyrgyzstan: Hizb Ut-Tahrir Rallies in South, Urges Election Boycott" (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 9 Feb. 2005). http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2005/02/2ff7fdef-dae8-4323-8f61–346a404f3ee9.html (accessed 15 May 2006).

31. Kadyr Taktogulov, "Kyrgyz President Demands Tougher Action against Terrorism, Criticizes Corruption in Law Enforcement Agencies," *Associated Press*, 23 Oct. 2004.

32. See, for example, E. Felner, "Torture and Terrorism: Painful Lessons from Israel," in K. Roth and M. Worden, eds., *Torture: Does It Make Us Safe? Is It Ever OK? A Human Rights Perspective* (New York: The New Press in Conjunction with Human Rights Watch, 2005), 28–44; M. Freeman, *Freedom or Security: The Consequences for Democracies Using Emergency Powers to Fight Terror* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003); M. Sidel, *More Secure Less Free? Antiterrorism Policy and Civil Liberties After September 11* (Ann Arbor, MI: The University of Michigan Press 2004); Alexander Yonah, ed., *Combating Terrorism: Strategies of Ten Countries* (Ann Arbor, MI: The University of Michigan Press, 2002).

33. Peter J. Katzenstein, Robert O. Keohane, and Stephen D. Krasner, "International Organization and the Study of World Politics," *International Organization* 52 (1998): 645–686.

34. James Fearon and Alexander Wendt, "Rationalism v. Constructivism: A Skeptical View," in Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse and Beth Simmons, eds., *Handbook of International Relations* (London: Sage, 2002), 54.

35. Constructivists are united in their criticism of rationalism but divided on a number of ontological and epistemological questions (e.g., constitutive vs. causal theory, explanatory vs. emancipatory cognitive interests, etc.). There are many debates that cut across ontological, methodological, and theoretical issues (e.g., an "agent-structure" debate that focuses on the question of the nature of reality and how it can be explained: looking at the actors, structures, or both) (Emanuel Adler, "Constructivism and International Relations," in W. Carlsnaes,

T. Risse, and B. A. Simmons, eds., *Handbook of International Relations* (London: Sage, 2002), 104).

36. Jerrery T. Checkel, "The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory (a review essay)," *World Politics* 50 (1998): 324–348; Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, "Taking Stock: The Constructivist Research Program in International Relations and Comparative Politics," *Annual Review of Political Science* 4 (2001): 391–416.

37. Ted Hopf, "The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory," *International Security* 23 (1998): 199.

38. Samuel J. Barkin, "Realist Constructivism," *International Studies Review* 5 (2003): 325–342; Fearon and Wendt (see note 34 above).

39. For further discussion see Barkin (see note 38 above); Fearon and Wendt (see note 34 above), 53.

40. Stephen M. Walt, "International Relations: One World, Many Theories," *Foreign Policy* (1998): 2–44.

41. Ludmila Polonskaya and Alexei Malashenko, *Islam in Central Asia* (Reading, England: Ithaca Press, 1994), 32–33.

42. Solomon (see note 4 above), 31; Ibid. (see note 41 above), 28–29.

43. Finnemore and Sikkink compare the cumulative effects of other states with "peer pressure" among countries and discuss three possible motivations—legitimation, conformity, and esteem—for responding to peer pressure (Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, "International Norms Dynamics and Political Change," *International Organization* 52 (August 1998): 887–917).

44. International Crisis Group (see note 5 above); Naumkin (see note 5 above).

45. Reuel Hanks, "Civil Society and Identity in Uzbekistan: The Emergent Role of Islam," in M. Holt Ruffin and Daniel C. Waugh (see note 27 above), 161.

46. "The Role of Religion in Politics of Central Asian and Caucuses," *Neweurasia*, Blogging Central Asia and Caucuses. http://neweurasia.net/?p = 425 (accessed 19 Aug. 2006).

47. Annette Bohr, *Uzbekistan: Politics and Foreign Policy* (The Royal Institute of International Affairs, Russia and Eurasia Programme, 1998), 25.

48. Lubin and Rubin (see note 13 above), 101.

49. For example, Adolat was an informal Islamist group that grew strong in the Namangan province and other parts of the Ferghana Valley of Uzbekistan in the early 1990s. It challenged local authorities by acting as a sort of voluntary Muslim militia for the enforcement of basic Islamic values and the prevention of crime. Adolat militia also tried to extend its activities to the capital of Uzbekistan, Tashkent. When President Karimov visited Namangan in 1992, Islamists took an open stand for legalization of Adolat (Bohr (see note 47 above); Naumkin (see note 5 above), 22).

50. Rajiv Tiwari, "Uzbekistan: President Sees Islamic Fundamentalism as a Threat," *Russian Press Digest*, 6 March 1993.

51. Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami (The Party of Islamic Liberation) is a radical Islamic group with thousands of members in the Central Asian region. It advocates re-establishment of the historical Islamic Caliphate on the territory of Central Asia, mostly by means of propaganda (International Crisis Group, "Radical Islam in Central Asia: Responding to Hizb ut-Tahrir," ICG Asia Report #58 (Osh/Brussels, 2003)); Emmanuel Karagiannis, "Political Islam and Social Movement Theory; the Case of Hizb ut-Tahrir in Kyrgyzstan," *Religion, State and Society* 33 (June 2005): 137.

52. International Crisis Group (see note 5 above), 4; Human Rights Watch, "'Bullets Were Falling Like Rain': The Andijan Massacre, May 13, 2005," 17, no. 5(D), June 2005. http://hrw.org/reports/2005/uzbekistan0605/ (accessed 1 May 2005).

53. Rajiv Tiwari (see note 50 above).

54. Polonskaya and Malashenko (see note 41 above).

55. Merkushev Alexander, "Uzbek President Dismisses Crackdown on Opposition," *The Associated Press*, 4 March 1993.

56. Jane Boulden and Thomas G. Weiss, eds., *Terrorism and the UN: Before and After September 11* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2004).

57. Marianne van Leeuwen, ed., *Confronting Terrorism: European Experiences, Threat Perceptions and Policies* (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2004).

58. U.S. Report on Foreign Terrorist Organizations. Released by the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, 5 Oct. 2001. http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/rpt/fto/2001/5258.htm (accessed 20 Mar. 2003).

59. U.S. Department of State Fact Sheets. http://www.state/gov/p/eur/rls/fs (accessed 4 June 2005).

60. "Uzbekistan: The Key to Success in Central Asia?" Hearing before the Subcommittee on the Middle East and Central Asia of the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives. 108th Congress, 2nd session, 15 June 2004. http://www.house.gov/international_relations

61. Vladimir Simonov, "Why is Uzbekistan losing interest in the West?" Eurasia Net, 2 Dec. 2005. http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/pp092905.shtml (accessed 13 Jan. 2006).

62. The causal origins of the civil war that began in 1992 have been a subject of a lively debate among the scholars of Central Asia. See, for example, John Glenn, *The Soviet Legacy in Central Asia* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999), 12–127; Mehrdad Haghayeghi, *Islam and Politics in Central Asia* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995), 142–151.

63. Islamic militants who invaded Kyrgyzstan in 1999 and 2000 were accused of maintaining bases in northeastern Tajikistan, and former UTO combatants were accused of participating in the incursion (Human Rights Watch (see note 19 above); Naumkin (see note 5 above)).

64. Malashenko (see note 5 above), 70.

65. The Islamic Renaissance Party is also known as the Party of Islamic Rebirth and the Islamic Revival Party.

66. А.Лукин, '"Аллах Акбар": Заметки с первого съезда Исламской партии возрождения Таджикистана', *Согласие*. 1 нояб. 1991.

67. Polonskaya and Malashenko (see note 41 above), 130.

68. Naumkin (see note 5 above), 27.

69. International Crisis Group (see note 5 above), 13–14.

70. International Crisis Group (see note 5 above), 14.

71. S. Poe, C. Tate, and L. Keith, "Repression of Human Rights to Personal Integrity Revised: A Global Cross-National Study Covering the Years 1976–1993," *International Studies Quarterly* 43 (1999): 295.

72. Human Rights Watch, "Human Rights Watch Press Backgrounder on Tajikistan," Human Rights Watch World Report 2001: Tajikistan, 5 Oct. 2001. http://www.hrw.org/backgrounder/eca/tajikbkg1005.htm (accessed 15 Mar. 2003).

73. International Crisis Group (see note 51 above), 35.

74. Hunter (see note 1 above), 327.

75. Najibullah (see note 17 above).

76. International Crisis Group (see note 51 above).

77. Vitalii Ponomarev, "A Watershed Event for Turkmenistan's Political Opposition: A Commentary for the Turkmenistan Project," EurasiaNet, 13 Sep. 2006. http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/rights/articles/eav112503.shtml (accessed 5 Sep. 2006). There are two competing "theories" about the November 2002 attack. In one, the security forces of President Niyazov staged the shooting as a pretext for tightening up control in the state. Another story tells of a failed coup attempt organized and carried out by the former Turkmen ministers who went into opposition of the Niyazov's cabinet. For a review of these "theories," see Annette Bohr, "A Failed Coup after All?" *Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst*, 18 June 2003. http://www.cacianalyst.org/view_article.php?articleid=1496&SMSESSION=NO (accessed 1 Nov. 2004).

78. "Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and the International Religious Freedom Act." Letter to U.S. Secretary of State Colin L. Powell. New York, 21 Aug. 2002. http://www.eurasianet.org/turkmenistan.project/files2/02-08-21HRWLetter%20to%20Colin%20Powell.doc (accessed 15 Mar. 2003).

79. Swari Parashar, "Turkmenistan: A Central Asian State without Religious Extremism," South Asia Analysis Group, Paper No. 1130, New Delhi, 30 Sep. 2004; "Islam in Turkmenistan," Country Blog, Turkmenistan, Neweurasia, 21 May 2006. http://turkmenistan.neweurasia.net/?p=135 (accessed 20 Aug. 2006).

80. International Crisis Group (see note 5 above), 34.

81. Cummings and Ochs (see note 21 above), 122–123.

82. MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Database. A Comprehensive Databank of Global Terrorist Incidents and Organizations. http://www.tkb.org/Home.jsp

83. The CIS World Fact Book, http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/ (accessed 28 Jun. 2004).

84. Polonskaya and Malashenko (see note 41 above), 33.

85. The role of Islam in Kazakh society somewhat intensified in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. However, the Kazakh nomads never observed Islamic prohibitions and laws very closely. Their Islamic practices, largely confined to the spheres of family life and cultural rites, were intertwined with pre-Islamic pagan traditions and Adat, a common law prevalent in the steppe (*С. Г., Кияшторный, Т. И. Султано*, 'Казахстан: летопись трех тысячелетий' (АлматыI 1992), 150–151; Сабит Жусупов, 'Ислам в Казахстане: прошлое, настоящее, будущее во взаимоотношениях государства и религии', Под ред. А. Малашенко и М. Брилл Олкотт, *Ислам на постсоветском пространстве: взгляд изнутри* (Моск. Центр Карнеги. - М.: Арт-Бизнес-Центр, август 2001). http://www.carnegie.ru/ru/pubs/books/36277.htm).

86. According to the results of the exit poll conducted during the Presidential election on 4 December 2005 by the International Republican Institution in Collaboration with Baltic Surveys and the Gallup organization, 87.3% of Russian respondents voted for the incumbent president Nazarbayev. Russians constituted 30.3% of the sample of 23,780 voters interviewed at 283 polling stations. www.iri.org/pdfs/KAZ%20EXIT%20REPORT.ppt (accessed 1 May 2006).

87. Among the Central Asian republics, Kazakhstan recognizes no Muslim holidays and does not mention Islam in its constitution (Martha B. Olcott, *Central Asia's New States: Independence, Foreign Policy, and Regional Security* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1996), 32).

88. "President says radical Islamic group stepping up activity in Kazakhstan," *Associated Press Worldstream*, 1 Sep. 2004. http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P1:98581134/President+says+radical+Islamic+group+stepping+up+activity+in+Kazakhstan.html (accessed 19 Aug. 2006). In 2005, the Minister of Emergency Situations of Kyrgyzstan, Muhambet Kopeyev, announced that international terrorist activities have been rampant recently and Kazakhstan should develop its capacity to effectively defend its territory and people against possible attacks (in "Kazakhstan Wraps up Anti-Terror maneuver," *PLA Daily*, 20 March 2005. http://english.chinamil.com.cn/site2/news-channels/2005–03/20/content_162815.htm (accessed 19 Aug. 2006).

89. "Group Behind Terrorist Attacks in Uzbekistan May Have Links in Kazakhstan, Anti-Terror Official Says," *Associated Press Worldstream*, 26 Apr. 2004.

90. Center for Defense Information (CDI) Arms Trade, "US military assistance to Kazakhstan," 11 Dec. 2003. http://www.cdi.org/friendlyversion/printversion.cfm?documentID=1912 (accessed 15 June 2005).

91. In November 2001, prominent business leaders, some of whom are former government officials, united in a new opposition movement, the Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan (DCK), under the slogan "Kazakhstan without Nazarbayev." The DCK voted to abandon this slogan during its meeting on 18 January, 2003 (Ibragim Alibekov, "Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan Abandoned Slogan 'Kazakhstan without Nazarbaev, '" EurasiaNet, 31 Jan. 2003. http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav013103.shtml (accessed 1 May 2006).

92. Martha B. Olcott, Central Asia's Second Chance (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005), 181–182. An electronic version of the book in Russian. http://www.carnegie.ru/ru/pubs/books/

93. Kadyr Toktogulov, "Kyrgyzstan Struggles to Keep Out Al-Qaida," *The Associated Press*, 3 March 2004. http://www.themoscowtimes.com/stories/2004/03/03/258.html (accessed 12 Jun. 2004).

94. However, recent scholarship has disputed this (Lubin and Rubin (see note 13 above), 40).

95. The south of Kyrgyzstan, populated by the ethnic Uzbeks, is characterized by much greater religious observance (International Crisis Group (see note 5 above), 22).

96. *И. Ротарь*, 'Интервью с А. Акаевым,', IM,' *Независимая газ.* 15 июля 1999.

97. Lubin and Rubin (see note 13 above), 9.

98. Игорь Неволин, 'Аскар Акаев: Развитие Демократии Не Должно Быть Стихийным: Вирус "цветочных" революций может привести к "цветочным" контрреволюциям, Литературный Киргизтан, Параллель, 24 Марта 2006. http://www.liter.kz/site.php?lan=russian&id=167&pub=3307 (accessed 20 Aug. 2006).

99. International Crisis Group (see note 5 above), 37.

100. Элмурад Жусупалиев, 'В Кыргызстане принят закон о борьбе с экстремизмом,' Новости Центральной Азии 7 Сент. 2005, http://www.ferghana.ru/article.php?id=3951 (accessed 20 Aug. 2006).

101. Ibid.

102. Nadia Usaeva, "Trial Focuses Attention on Possible Uighur Repression" (RFE/RL 8 Aug. 2001). http://www.rferl.org/nca/features/2001/08/31082001115924.asp (accessed 12 May 2006).

103. Gulnoza Saidazimova, "Kyrgyz-Uzbek Authorities Battle Religious Dissent," *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty*, 11 Aug. 2006.

104. See for review, Wojciech Bartuzi, Grzegorz Zasada, and Marceli Zygała, "Central Asia after September 11, 2001 - Political Islam Draws Back;" Islam in Central Asia – CES Research Programm, 19 Dec. 2002 (Translated by Izabela Zygmunt); Saltanat Berdikeeva, "Myth and Reality of Islamist Extremism in Central Asia," Eurasia 21; "The Role of Religion in Politics of Central Asian and Caucuses" (see note 46 above).

105. "The Role of Religion in Politics of Central Asian and Caucuses" (see note 46 above).

106. The policies of Tsarist and Soviet Russia had strengthened this pattern. In the lands of nomads, the colonial regime encouraged Russification, while in the sedentary regions it sought to regulate existing Islamic institutions (International Crisis Group (see note 5 above)).

107. Hunter (see note 1 above), 334.

108. Bohr (see note 47 above), 21.

109. Hooman Peimani, "Abusing the 'War on Terrorism' in Central Asia,' Central Asia-Caucasus, 16 Aug. 2002. http://www.e-ariana.com/ariana/eariana.nsf/allDocsArticles/07E3B1B0353C639287256C17005F637B?OpenDocument (accessed 15 May 2005).

110. Aziz Niyazi, "Islam and Tajikistan's Human and Ecological Crisis," in M. Holt Ruffin and Daniel C. Waugh, eds., *Civil Society in Central Asia* (Seattle, WA: Center for Civil Society International in association with University of Washington Press, 1999), 189–190.

111. Polonskaya and Malashenko (see note 41 above), 127.

112. Mark I. Linchbach, "Deterrence or Escalation? The Puzzle of Aggregate Studies of Repression and Dissent," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 31 (1998): 266–297; Will H. Moore, "Repression and Dissent: Substitution, Context, and Timing," *American Journal of Political Science* 42 (1998): 851–873.

113. Bryan Brophy-Baermann and John A. C. Conybeare, "Retaliating against Terrorism: Rational Expectations and the Optimality of Rules versus Discretion," *American Journal of Political Science* 38 (1994): 196–210.

114. Alisher Khamidov, *Countering the Call: The U.S., Hizb ut-Tahrir, and Religious Extremism in Central Asia* (Washington, DC: The Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution, 2003), 15; International Crisis Group (see note 5 above).

115. Commission on Human Rights, Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/31, 27 June 2001.