



Military Aid and Human Rights: Assessing the Impact of U.S. Security Assistance Programs

Author(s): MARIYA OMELICHEVA, BRITTNEE CARTER and LUKE B. CAMPBELL

Source: *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 132, No. 1 (Spring 2017), pp. 119-144

Published by: Oxford University Press

Stable URL: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/45175796>

Accessed: 14-04-2023 20:47 UTC

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at <https://about.jstor.org/terms>



JSTOR

Oxford University Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to *Political Science Quarterly*

Military Aid and Human Rights: Assessing the Impact of U.S. Security Assistance Programs

MARIYA OMELICHEVA
BRITTNEE CARTER
LUKE B. CAMPBELL

APPROXIMATELY 109,000 MILITARY STUDENTS from 160 countries participated in U.S. security cooperation programs during fiscal year 2012. The total cost of approximately 53,700 individual events, through which the U.S. government trained foreign military, police, and law enforcement officers, was \$1.017 billion.¹ Foreign military sales, which have been on the rise since 2006, also peaked in 2012, with \$69.1 billion in sales of defense articles and services to foreign countries and international organizations.² The U.S. government has long contended that this scale of security assistance yields considerable payoffs.

¹U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, "Foreign Military Training and DoD Engagement Activities of Interest, 2011–2012," accessed at <http://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/rpt/fmtrpt/2012/index.htm>, 21 May 2015.

²Cheryl Pellerin, "U.S. Foreign Military Sales Promote Security Cooperation," 18 September 2013, accessed at <http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=120815>, 21 May 2015.

MARIYA Y. OMELICHEVA is an Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Kansas. Her primary research interests are Eurasian security, Russia's foreign policy, and international democratization. BRITTNEE CARTER is a Ph.D. candidate in political science at the University of Kansas with particular interests in international security, terrorism and political violence. LUKE B. CAMPBELL is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Humanities and Social Sciences at Northwest Missouri State University. His primary research interests include international relations theory, international ethics, and U.S. foreign policy.

It increases the professionalism of foreign security forces and encourages other states to develop their own defenses, thus reducing the need to commit U.S. forces in local crisis situations. It promotes respect for democratic values and human rights among the foreign security cadres and serves as an instrument of foreign influence through which the U.S. government can shape the military doctrines and operating procedures of recipient countries. Even the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and similar programs have been framed as important instruments in strengthening the security of the United States and its friends and allies. The idea is that sales of U.S. equipment and services increase coalition interoperability, leading to more joint exercises and other types of military-to-military cooperation and to decades-long relationships between the U.S. military and partners around the world.

This vision and annual budget requests to sponsor it have received enthusiastic support from the U.S. Congress and the U.S. government. Successive U.S. secretaries of state—Condoleezza Rice, Hillary Clinton, and John Kerry—have trumpeted U.S. military exchange and training programs as a powerful source of U.S. soft power.³ This view has been widely shared within the defense community. Former secretary of defense Robert Gates noted that security cooperation conducted through bilateral and multilateral training and exercises, foreign military sales and financing (FMF), officer exchange programs, and educational opportunities at professional military schools “further[s] the U.S. objectives of securing a peaceful and cooperative international order. . . . In today’s complex and interdependent security environment, these dimensions of the U.S. defense strategy have never been more important.”⁴

In January 2013, however, the U.S. government announced plans to reduce U.S. military spending to cope with the soaring budget deficit. U.S. foreign military assistance and training programs have come under increased congressional scrutiny. Several House

³Carol Atkinson, *Military Soft Power: Public Diplomacy through Military Educational Exchanges* (Lanham, MD: Roman & Littlefield, 2014), 4.

⁴U.S. Department of Defense, “Quadrennial Defense Review Report,” 12 February 2010, 26, accessed at http://www.defense.gov/qdr/images/QDR_as_of_12Feb10_1000.pdf, 21 May 2015. See also Robert M. Gates, “Statement of Secretary of Defense before Senate Appropriations Committee,” 15 June 2011, accessed at <http://www.dod.mil/dodgc/olc/docs/testGates06152011.pdf>, 21 May 2015; and Michael G. Mullen, “Posture Statement of Admiral Michael G. Mullen, USN Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Before the 112th Congress, Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense,” 17 February 2011, accessed at <http://dod.mil/dodgc/olc/docs/testMullen06152011.pdf>, 21 May 2015.

representatives have suggested cutting back the amount and types of aid given to foreign militaries instead of lowering support for education and training of U.S. personnel. Against the backdrop of declining U.S. spending on defense, arms exports to the Middle East and other less stable territories have increased in recent years, changing the geography of international defense trade. Allegations of human rights abuses and deteriorating security situations in these states sparked congressional opposition to arms sales in the Middle East and other less stable regions and resulted in revisions to the United States Conventional Arms Transfer Policy.⁵

Unfortunately, neither the Department of State nor the Department of Defense—the two agencies sharing responsibility for funding, managing, and overseeing the multitude of security cooperation programs—has established a comprehensive performance evaluation plan. Existing efforts to assess the overall effectiveness of U.S. security assistance have been scattered across discrete and piecemeal evaluation strategies that offer a poor match to the programs' expected long-term impacts. For instance, there is no readily available data that can be used to assess the extent to which programs' graduates apply the new skills in their military careers, how their knowledge contributes to institutional changes, and whether the exposure to democratic principles and values has any impact on subsequent respect for human rights.⁶ In the U.S. Congress, several committees bear responsibility for overseeing military training, but none has command of the scope, magnitude, or impact of U.S. military aid.⁷ With a few exceptions,⁸ there has been little academic scrutiny or public debate over the impact of U.S. military aid.

The goal of this article is to systematically examine the impact of U.S. security assistance programs on foreign militaries' respect for civilians' rights in the context of a broader political conflict calling for military involvement. We chose to focus on atrocities, defined as the deliberate use of lethal violence against noncombatant civilians by state actors

⁵Andy Irwin, Ed Krauland, Meredith Rathbone, Jack Hayes, Tom Barletta, and Peter Jeydel, "Foreign Military Sales: First Revision of the U.S. Conventional Arms Transfer Policy in Nearly Two Decades," 5 February 2014, accessed at <http://www.steptoe.com/publications-9339.html>, 21 May 2015.

⁶U.S. Government Accountability Office, *International Military Education and Training: Agencies Should Emphasize Human Rights Training and Improve Evaluations*, Report To Congressional Committees, GAO-12-123 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2011).

⁷Lora Lumpe, "Military Training Programs: A Need for Oversight and Human Rights Courses," 1 June 2002, accessed at http://fpif.org/military_training_programs_a_need_for_oversight_and_human_rights_courses/, 21 May 2015.

⁸See, for example, Atkinson, *Military Soft Power*.

engaged in a wider political or military conflict,⁹ instead of more traditional human rights abuses for several reasons. First, doing so allows us to capture a broader range of human rights violations and breaches of human rights and international humanitarian law that are traditionally left out of the commonly used indices of human rights abuses. Second, conflicts producing atrocities are not limited to wars but may be motivated by a variety of interests, including the desire to wield state authority, control economic resources, or change the status of a particular ethnic or religious community.¹⁰ Third, by changing the dependent variable to atrocities, we can control for the human rights situation in the states that are recipients of U.S. security assistance. Lastly, the majority of studies examining the impact of U.S. military aid have focused on its outcomes in terms of human rights practices.¹¹ Our intent is to build on and expand this scholarship.

A particular focus of this article is the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program, the primary program of the U.S. government that provides grant funding for a variety of education and training programs for foreign military personnel. The article relies on an original data set compiled from the reports on “Foreign Military Training and DoD Engagement Activities of Interest” and a global event data set on the deliberate targeting of noncombatants in the context of wider political conflict covering 1995 to the present.¹² We begin with an overview of IMET and other U.S. security assistance programs, followed by a brief discussion of controversies surrounding U.S. military aid. The third section outlines the research design, including descriptions of the data sources and variables. The statistical results are presented next. We conclude with an overall discussion of the findings.

⁹Jay Ulfelder and Philip Schrodt, “Political Instability Task Force Worldwide Atrocities Event Data Collection Codebook, Version 1.0B2,” 2009, accessed at <http://eventdata.parusanalytics.com/data.dir/Atrocities.codebook.1.0B2.pdf>, 4 January 2017.

¹⁰Ibid.

¹¹See, for example, David L. Cingranelli and Thomas E. Pasquarello, “Human Rights Practices and the U.S. Distribution of Foreign Aid to Latin American Countries,” *American Journal of Political Science* 29 (August 1985): 539–563; Steven C. Poe, “Human Rights and the Allocation of U.S. Military Assistance,” *Journal of Peace Research* 28 (May 1991): 205–216; Katherine E. McCoy, “Trained to Torture? The Human Rights Effect of Military Training at the School of America,” *Latin American Perspectives* 32 (November 2005): 47–64; Lars Schoultz, “U.S. Foreign Policy and Human Rights Violations in Latin America: A Comparative Analysis of Foreign Aid Distributions,” *Comparative Politics* 13 (January 1981): 149–170; and Michael Stohl and David Carleton, “The Foreign Policy of Human Rights: Rhetoric and Reality from Jimmy Carter to Ronald Reagan,” *Human Rights Quarterly* 7 (May 1985): 205–229.

¹²The Worldwide Atrocities Event Dataset was funded by the Office of Transnational Issues in the Central Intelligence Agency’s Directorate of Intelligence. The funding for the project was received by Dr. Phil Schrodt. The data were collected under the auspices of the Political Instability Task Force.

U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS: AN OVERVIEW

International military exchanges between the United States and foreign military personnel began in the late nineteenth century, but the early U.S. exchange and training programs had few participants because the American military establishments and their curricula were regarded as inferior to those of their European counterparts. This perception and exchange practices began to change with the rise of the United States as a military and economic power.¹³ Already in 1941–1945, the U.S. Army Air Forces provided technical and professional training to more than 18,000 students from 31 countries.¹⁴ But it was in the post–World War II context that the United States became the world’s single-largest provider of security assistance to other states worldwide. Authorized under three public laws—the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (as amended), the Arms Export Control Act of 1976 (as amended), and the Annual Appropriations Acts for Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs—security assistance encompasses a wide range of programs by which the United States provides defense articles, military education and training, and other defense-related services by grant, loan, credit, cash sales, or lease, in furtherance of national objectives.¹⁵

The FMS program, which facilitates sales of U.S. arms, defense equipment, defense services, and military training to foreign governments and international organizations, represents the largest share of U.S. security cooperation assistance (see Table 1). In support of FMS, the U.S. government designed the FMF program for financing the acquisition of U.S. defense, articles, services, and training through grants or loans. There are more than a dozen security assistance programs funded by the Department of State and Department of Defense, all of which include elements of military training and exchange (see the Appendix). The Department of State sponsors IMET and provides funding for the FMS, International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL), and Enhanced International Peacekeeping Capabilities programs. The Department of Defense is charged with the implementation of IMET and sponsors Drug Interdiction and Counter-Drug Activities, Humanitarian Demining, and Service Sponsored Activities, such as the Aviation Leadership Program. In addition, the Office of the Secretary of Defense has sponsored a variety of

¹³Atkinson, *Military Soft Power*.

¹⁴U.S. Army Air Forces, “Training of Foreign Nationals by the AAF 1939–1945,” *Army Air Force Historical Studies* 64 (1947): 1–5.

¹⁵Defense Security Cooperation Agency, “Security Assistance Management Manual DoD5105-38M,” 10 March 2003, accessed at <http://www.samm.dsca.mil/sites/default/files/2003%20SAMM/2003-10-03%20%202003%20SAMM.pdf>, 21 May 2015.

TABLE 1
U.S. Security Assistance Programs, 1995–2012

<i>Program</i>	<i>Total Dollars Allocated</i>	<i>Total Number of Trained Foreign Military Students</i>
<i>Programs Funded by the Department of State</i>		
Foreign Military Sales	\$3,320,526,066.00	144,252
Foreign Military Financing	\$633,349,360.00	56,958
IMET	\$1,007,458,421.00	101,093
International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement	\$42,176,857.00	11,465
Enhanced International Peacekeeping Capabilities Program	\$1,748,247.00	525
<i>Programs Funded by the Department of Defense</i>		
Department of Defense Regional Centers for Security Studies	\$213,638,855.00	67,900
Drug Interdiction and Counter-Drug Activities	\$432,794,772.00	105,476
Professional Military Education Exchange Program	\$3,864,537.00	1,209
Joint Combined Exchange Training Program	\$1,460,492.00	431
Unified Command Engagement Activities Program (including demining)	\$248,900,543.00	65,109
Regional Defense Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program	\$211,184,529.00	23,852
Academy Exchanges/Service Academy Foreign Student Program	\$103,030,499.00	2,293
Aviation Leadership Program	\$8,338,008.00	460

Source: U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, “Foreign Military Training and DoD Engagement Activities of Interest,” reports for 1995–2012.

Notes: Some of these programs listed here were launched in the 2000s; others were suspended for several years. The list of programs is not exhaustive. It excludes, for example, programs funded by the Department of Homeland Security (for example, U.S. Coast Guard Activities) and programs authorized by the U.S. Congress for certain years and certain regions (for example, the African Crisis Response Initiative Program). The totals for individual programs exclude security assistance to international organizations, NATO in particular.

programs, such as Defense Institution Building, the Defense Institution Reform Initiative, and the Warsaw Initiative Program, which are similar to IMET in that they are designed to enhance partner capacity and advance democratic reform of defense establishments and military forces in recipient states.

The primary difference between the various U.S. security assistance programs is their source of financing: the United States sells foreign military training, defense equipment, and services to wealthier states through the FMS and FMF programs and provides grant aid to states that are unable to afford such training and purchases. The programs also differ in their intent. As discussed in greater detail later, IMET (and Expanded IMET) is a deliberate effort to expose foreign military and civilian personnel to democratic values and internationally recognized

human rights, whereas this objective takes a back seat when it comes to FMF and FMS.

IMET, established in 1976, is a major grant program that allows the U.S. government to provide foreign military personnel with high-quality military education and training at professional military institutions in the United States without any charge, although “an equitable contribution of support and services from each participating country” may be required.¹⁶ American legislators’ intent in establishing IMET was to help foreign military leaders and selected junior officers from states considered to be U.S. “friends” or allies that were financially incapable of purchasing U.S. training under the Foreign Military Sales Act to meet their security needs.

Although IMET was designed primarily for foreign military personnel, changes to IMET adopted in the early 1990s allow civilian personnel working on military matters and those serving in nondefense ministries, parliaments, and nongovernmental organizations to take part in IMET courses. The scope of the program was also modified. In the 1990s, Congress shifted IMET’s focus to responsible management of defense resources; greater understanding of democracy, including the principle of civilian control of the military; improved military judicial systems; and respect for human rights. This came to be known as the Expanded IMET (E-IMET) program because of the inclusion of foreign civilian officials and increased emphasis on democratic values and human rights.¹⁷

Since the introduction of E-IMET in 1990, the singular focus has been to develop and provide IMET courses specifically aimed at addressing issues of human rights and related concepts such as military justice systems and the administration of procedures in line with established international human rights law.¹⁸ Indeed, of the three overall objectives of the IMET program, E-IMET is devoted specifically to fostering greater understanding of democracy, which includes an exclusive focus on human rights. To further this central goal, approval of a country’s overall IMET program is tied to E-IMET-certified courses, which make up a certain percentage of the total IMET offerings (although it is not clear what that percentage is). Under the administration of the Department of Defense, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency requires that at least 51 percent of course

¹⁶U.S. Congress, *Legislation on Foreign Relations through 2008*, vol. IA of *Current Legislation and Related Executive Orders* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2010), 294–295, accessed at <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CPRT-111JPRT54608/html/CPRT-111JPRT54608.htm>, 1 May 2015.

¹⁷U.S. Government Accountability Office, *International Military Education and Training: Agencies Should Emphasize Human Rights Training and Improve Evaluations*, Report to Congressional Committees, GAO-12-123 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2011), 3.

¹⁸*Ibid.*, 3.

content must address E-IMET's stated objectives. Since 2010, 141 E-IMET-certified courses have been offered through the IMET program, signaling a clear intentionality in line with a congressionally mandated focus.¹⁹

IMET grew considerably during the administrations of George W. Bush and Barack Obama. Its annual budget increased from \$50 million in fiscal year 2000 to more than \$106 million in fiscal year 2014. Professional Military Education (PME) accounts for more than half of the IMET costs and is also the principal category of instruction requested by foreign governments. Political and military authorities in many new democracies have contended with the need for institutional adjustments to create a political culture that emphasizes increased interaction with civilian authorities. Subsequently, political leaders in these states have chosen to expose promising military officers to the professional education and practices associated with the U.S. democratic system.²⁰ PME was specifically designed to teach officers the skills necessary for managing a professional army and to prepare them for military leadership positions in their states. Foreign students must be proficient in English to take part in the IMET-funded courses. And English-language training program is designed for those foreign students who must learn English before attending U.S. schools. Technical training is another type of IMET training focusing on the skills necessary for maintaining and operating weapon systems or performing required functions within a military operational specialty.²¹

To reiterate, contrary to popular belief, IMET is not the only program that provides military training and exchange. The majority of U.S. security assistance programs, including FMS, include professional and technical training of foreign military personnel. This training is offered under the auspices of several federal agencies in more than 200 U.S. schools and other facilities. Foreign students trained in the United States under different programs often attend the same schools and courses. Each of the four military services within the U.S. military—the U.S. Army, Marine Corps, Air Force, and Navy—has its own war college and staff college devoted to educating senior leaders within its military branch. This has contributed to the proliferation of military training and exchange programs and created challenges related to tracking the numbers

¹⁹Ibid., 3.

²⁰John A. Cope, *International Military Education and Training: An Assessment* (Washington, DC: National Defense University, Institute for National Strategic Studies, 1995).

²¹Ibid., 3.

of foreign trainees and assessing the overall impact of the U.S. military support.

CONTROVERSIES SURROUNDING INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRAINING

Despite the tenacious belief that U.S. security assistance plays a valuable role in improving interoperability between the United States and foreign troops, building mutually beneficial relations with foreign governments and militaries, and fostering respect for civil authority and human rights, IMET and other programs have been assailed by critics within and outside the U.S. government. The criticisms span a number of issues, ranging from poor public oversight to misappropriation of aid because of corruption in the grant recipient states. Another major concern that is assessed in this article relates to the ineffectiveness of foreign military aid in instilling respect for human rights.

U.S. law places restrictions on security assistance to countries whose governments engage in persistent human rights violations, unless the president certifies in writing to Congress that extraordinary circumstances warrant the provision of such assistance.²² On 15 January 2014, the White House released a revised version of the United States Conventional Arms Transfer Policy that prohibits the U.S. government from authorizing arms transfers to states that are engaged in crimes against humanity, genocide, grave violations of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, attacks directed against civilian objects or civilians, or other war crimes. It also calls for restraint against the transfer of arms that would enhance the military capabilities of hostile states or serve to facilitate human rights abuses or violations of international humanitarian law.²³ Although the restraint principles for the transfer of arms are given more prominent treatment in the new policy, those principles are not entirely new. The previous version of the policy issued by the Bill Clinton administration in 1995 listed human rights among several criteria for all arms transfer decisions.²⁴

Despite these legal provisos, the U.S. government has supplied military aid to many states with less than stellar human rights records.²⁵ The

²²See U.S.C.S. 2304(a)(2) 1982, as quoted in David Forsythe, "Congress and Human Rights in U.S. Foreign Policy: The Fate of General Legislation," *Human Rights Quarterly* 9 (1987): 382-404.

²³Irwin et al., "Foreign Military Sales: First Revision."

²⁴White House Office of the Press Secretary, "Fact Sheet: Criteria for Decisionmaking on U.S. Arms Exports," 17 February 1995, accessed at <http://fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd34.htm>, 21 May 2015.

²⁵Cingranelli and Pasquarello, "Human Rights Practices"; Poe, "Human Rights and the Allocation of U.S. Military Assistance"; McCoy, "Trained to Torture?"; Schoultz, "U.S. Foreign Policy and Human Rights Violations in Latin America"; and Stohl and Carleton, "The Foreign Policy of Human Rights."

Clinton administration, for example, supported military training for several sub-Saharan regimes, including Rwanda, Uganda, and Zimbabwe, all of which were implicated in human rights abuses domestically and pursued aggressive foreign policy toward their neighbors. Under the George W. Bush administration, human rights took a back seat to the immediate strategic interests of the United States. Under a new strategy of President Bush, the U.S. government rewarded states that provided assistance to the United States in its global “war on terror,” notwithstanding their flagrant human rights violations. Pakistan, for instance, received almost \$2 million in IMET funding for assisting the United States in its anti-Taliban operations. IMET assistance was increased for the authoritarian Central Asian states. In fiscal year 2008, the United States allocated \$333,000 in IMET funds for Libya. President Bush proposed an additional \$350,000 for Libya in fiscal year 2009, and the Obama administration proposed another \$350,000 in fiscal year 2010.

U.S. military training programs have graduated some of the most notorious anti-democrats and human rights violators worldwide. For a long time, the U.S. Army School of the Americas (SOA), renamed the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation in 2001, has been the main target of human rights defenders. Its critics have argued that the SOA is marred by a “history and tradition of abusive graduates,” which tends to “associate the United States with those abusers” and serves “as a barrier to establishing a new and constructive relationship with Latin American militaries.”²⁶ Individual graduates of the former SOA continue to make headlines for their repressive or antidemocratic activities. The nongovernmental organization SOA Watch maintains a list of several hundred Latin American SOA graduates accused of crimes ranging from corruption to torture, assassinations, and coup attempts; the Department of Defense vigorously disputes these allegations, finding them factually wrong and deliberately misleading. Human rights abusers in other parts of the world have also studied in the U.S. military establishments. Amadou Touré, a mastermind of Mali’s 2012 military coup, for example, received military training in the United States. Thousands of Egyptian military officers have been trained through IMET. International groups have been highly critical of the U.S. government’s decisions to provide

²⁶This is the language used by Congressmen Joseph Kennedy and Ron Dellums in a letter urging President Clinton to eliminate funding for the SOA in fiscal year 1996 Appropriation Bill (see Cope, *International Military Education and Training*, 22). The same language is used in the text of a bill—H.R. 611—to close the United States Army School of the Americas introduced in the House of Representatives on 5 February 1997.

military aid to regimes, such as Chad, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Libya, Sudan, and Yemen, all of which utilize children as soldiers.

Contrary to this evidence, Carol Atkinson's 2014 study of U.S.-hosted military educational exchange programs found strong support for their effectiveness at nurturing a democratic culture within militaries around the world.²⁷ The survey data examined in that study showed that international officers returned to their home countries with a deeper understanding and appreciation of the United States, its people, and values. Empirical analyses of the U.S. military exchange and training programs showed that the military exchanges were an important element of U.S. foreign policy because those countries that participated were more likely to develop democratic institutions than those that did not participate.

Theoretically speaking, educational and extracurricular opportunities that are designed to promote respect for human rights and introduce foreign officers to U.S. values and culture as part of the IMET and similar programs provide a testing ground for the impact of particular beliefs and ideas through the process of socialization of U.S.-hosted military personnel. International participants in the U.S. education and training program learn concepts that are fundamental to U.S. military doctrine, equipment, and operating procedures. They are also introduced to democratic values, democratic institutions, and practices that demonstrate respect for internationally recognized human rights.²⁸ It is expected that through the deeply engaged and intentional curricula of military training programs, foreign military officers would acquire a better understanding of the ways in which the U.S. military operates, an appreciation of its foundational values, personal connections to the people espousing those values, and, possibly, even a desire to emulate them.

Instilling new beliefs and persuading the learners to embrace these ideas is an important aspect of building American "soft power"—ability to attract and co-opt rather than coerce. Values, culture, policies, and institutions are the "primary currencies" of soft power.²⁹ As a result, international exchanges of any kind, including exchanges of foreign students, teachers, professionals, as well as the military cadres, have long been viewed as potent instruments of the American soft power with deep and long-lasting impact on foreign societies.

²⁷Atkinson, *Military Soft Power*.

²⁸Ibid.

²⁹Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics* (New York: PublicAffairs, 2004), 31.

RESEARCH DESIGN

To assess the impact of U.S. security assistance programs on the conduct of recipient states' militaries in conflict situations as far as their respect for civilians' human rights is concerned, we assembled a novel data set containing data on U.S. foreign security cooperation programs and civilian atrocities committed by government military and/or police (or with their participation) worldwide.

Data for the dependent variable, civilian atrocities, which is operationalized as the total number of deaths of civilians from the hands of the military in a given year, were extracted from the Worldwide Atrocities Event Dataset.³⁰ The project was developed with the goal of enhancing our understanding and improving our ability to predict atrocities worldwide. Atrocities are defined as the deliberate use of lethal violence against noncombatant civilians by actors engaged in a wider political or military conflict. The data in the original project were coded from five international news sources. Each event data entry contains detailed information about the event, including its date and location, characteristics of the perpetrator, perpetrator motivations, characteristics of the victims, casualties, mode of killing, and related tactics.

For the purposes of this article, we singled out all events for which a state is recorded as a perpetrator in one of the following roles: (1) the state is a solo perpetrator, that is, atrocities were committed by employees of a state agency—members of the armed forces, the police, other security forces, or any other government agency; (2) atrocities were committed by a nonstate actor but with purported state support or state sanction; or (3) atrocities were committed by multiple perpetrators, including the state. We converted the event data into tabular form in which state-years are the unit of analysis. For each state, we calculated the total number of atrocities (people killed) by agents of the state. To test for the robustness of the findings, we also assessed all models using the Cingranelli and Richards Physical Integrity Rights Index (CIRI)³¹ as a dependent variable and treatment effect analysis.

We used several empirical indicators to measure U.S. security assistance: (1) total U.S. military assistance per capita in a given year, in constant 2005 U.S. dollars³²; (2) the total number of trainees from all programs funded by the

³⁰Ulfelder and Schrodt, "Political Instability Task Force Worldwide Atrocities Event Data Collection Codebook."

³¹David L. Cingranelli and David L. Richards, "Measuring the Level, Pattern, and Sequence of Government Respect for Physical Integrity Rights," *International Studies Quarterly* 43 (June 1999): 407–418.

³²United States Agency for International Development, "U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants: Obligations and Loan Authorizations, July 1, 1945–September 30, 2012," accessed at <https://eads.usaid.gov/gbk/>, 1 May 2015.

Departments of State and Defense during the year; and (3) the total amount allocated for all security assistance programs during the year, in U.S. dollars.³³ The last two indicators were extracted from reports published by the Department of State's Bureau of Political-Military Affairs.³⁴ Total U.S. military assistance is a broader category than the total allocation of all security assistance programs. Total U.S. military assistance includes a comprehensive list of military accounts with noneconomic development purposes. In addition to FMF and IMET, it encompasses Peace Keeping Operations, Military Construction, Excess Defense articles, and other accounts. The dollar amounts were logged in all of the models. In addition, we tested the impact of individual security cooperation assistance programs (measured by total dollars spent and total number of trainees per year per state) on civilian casualties (see the Appendix for a complete list of independent variables).

The following variables were used as controls in the models:

- (1) Cingranelli and Richards Physical Integrity Rights Index, to control for the overall human rights situation in the country.³⁵ The index ranges from 0 (no government respect for basic integrity rights, which include prohibition of torture, extrajudicial killing, political imprisonment, and disappearance) to 8 (full government respect for these rights).³⁶
- (2) Gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, using constant 2005 prices in U.S. dollars.³⁷ A log of the variable is used in the equation.
- (3) Logged country population.³⁸
- (4) United Nations region identifier. We rank-ordered the regions from 1 to 6 using means of their Physical Integrity Rights Index scores: 6 = Oceania (mean = 7.18), 5 = Europe (mean = 6.59), 4 = North America (mean = 6.41), (3 = Latin America (mean = 5.07), 2 = Africa (mean = 4.14), 1 = Asia (mean = 3.78).
- (5) Polity score, to control for the regime type. We used a modified version of the combined annual Polity variable, where all instances of "standardized authority scores" (-66, -77, and -88) are converted to conventional Polity scores ranging from -10 to +10.³⁹

³³Ibid.

³⁴U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, "Foreign Military Training and DoD Engagement Activities of Interest."

³⁵Cingranelli and Richards, "Measuring the Level, Pattern, and Sequence of Government Respect for Physical Integrity Rights." When the CIRI index was used as a dependent variable, it was excluded from the right-hand side of the equation.

³⁶Details on the index's construction and use can be found in Cingranelli and Richards, "Measuring the Level, Pattern, and Sequence of Government Respect for Physical Integrity Rights."

³⁷United Nation Statistics Division, Economic Statistics Branch, "The National Accounts Main Aggregates Database," accessed at <http://unstats.un.org/unsd/snaama/Introduction.asp>, 17 January 2017.

³⁸Ibid.

³⁹Monty G. Marshall, Ted Robert Gurr, and Keith Jagers, "Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2013: Dataset Users' Manual," Center for Systemic Peace, 2014, accessed at <http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/p4manualv2015.pdf>, 17 January 2017.

Given the prevalence of zeros in the dependent count variables (more than 92 percent of cases) and their overdispersion, zero-inflated negative binomial regression was used for regressing the listed independent variables on the counts of civilian deaths. Zero-inflated negative binomial is warranted by the Vuong statistic, suggesting a better fit of this model compared with the standard negative binomial and zero-inflated Poisson regression.⁴⁰ All models were tested using STATA13 with the robust option. We lagged all measures of U.S. security cooperation assistance by two years but carried out additional tests with one-year lags.

We chose the two-year lag for the security assistance measures for the following reasons: U.S. international military education and training programs vary in their duration. Some last only a few weeks, while others span a period of one year or more. The majority of international officers who attend war colleges or staff colleges in the United States are of the rank of major (or the equivalent). They are at the midpoint of their military career, and they are also considered to be the most promising military cadres. Selection to attend a U.S. war or staff college is a clear affirmation of their importance within their military and their potential to rise to a high-ranking position in their home country.⁴¹ International officers are considered very competitive for selection to important operational command positions; however, it does not happen immediately upon their return. Taking into consideration both the average duration of the U.S. programs and the rank of the participating military officers, we presume that a two-year lag is sufficient to see the results of the U.S. military training and exchange.

A zero-inflated negative binomial model is premised on the assumption that the excess zeros are generated by a process that is separate from the dynamics accounting for the count values. Because the World Atrocities Event Dataset records civilian casualties over the course of a wider political or military conflict, we presume that the “zeros” in the count variable are attributable to the absence of major episodes of political violence in those states. To model this process, we included a “magnitude of conflict” (MoC) variable that represents the total magnitude of all (societal and interstate) major episodes of political violence. Taken from the Major Episodes of Political Violence (MEPV) and Conflict Regions data set,⁴² the MoC

⁴⁰Quang H. Vuong, “Likelihood Ratio Tests for Model Selection and Non-Nested Hypotheses,” *Econometrica* 57 (March 1989): 307–333.

⁴¹Atkinson, *Military Soft Power*.

⁴²Monty G. Marshall, “Codebook: Major Episodes of Political Violence (MEPV) and Conflict Regions 1946–2012,” Center for Systemic Peace, 30 April 2012, accessed at <http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/MEPVcodebook2015.pdf>, 17 January 2017.

index may range from 0 (no episodes of violence) to 60 (highest magnitude on several episodes of domestic and international political violence). Major episodes of political violence are defined by the systematic and sustained use of lethal violence by organized groups that results in at least 500 directly related deaths over the course of the episode. Episodes are coded for time span and magnitude and assigned to one of seven categories of armed conflict: international violence, international war, international independence war, civil violence, civil war, ethnic violence, or ethnic war.

FINDINGS

Tables 2 and 3 report findings from the models assessing the impacts of different measures of U.S. security assistance on total civilian deaths perpetrated by the government (as a solo perpetrator or as an accomplice) in political incidents and campaigns that took place during a given year. We report findings for U.S. security assistance measures (dollars spent and number of trainees for all programs and individual programs) lagged by two years. The total dollars spent and number of trainees represent summaries for all Foreign Military and Department of Defense Engagement Activities for a given state in a year. However, we only report findings for those individual programs that received the largest amount of U.S. government support, were funded continuously over the period of study, and supported trainees from the greater number of states included in the analysis.

As can be seen from the results, the total amount of dollars spent on all U.S. Foreign Military and Department of Defense Engagement Activities is negatively associated with the number of civilian atrocities, whereas the total number of trainees participating in all U.S. programs shows a positive correlation with the number of civilian casualties. Both results are statistically significant ($p < .05$). A positive correlation between the number of trainees and civilian deaths attributed to the militaries of states that received U.S. military assistance reflects the fact that some of the largest security assistance programs, which are also positively correlated with civilian casualties, were included in the total. FMS, for example, one of the largest programs in terms of both total dollars spent and total number of trainees, is positively associated with civilian casualties. In other words, states that buy higher amounts of U.S. defense equipment as well as services and training associated with those sales are more likely to experience higher numbers of civilian deaths by the state military and police. This is hardly surprising; the majority of U.S. arms sales in recent years went to the Arab states of the Gulf Cooperation Council and Iraq. Saudi Arabia, for

TABLE 2
Impact of U.S. International Military Training and Education Programs on Civilian Atrocities

IVs	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
U.S. Military Aid	0.06*** (0.029)										
Total \$ (All Pro-grams)		-0.067** (0.034)									
Total Trainees (All Programs)			0.0004** (0.0002)								
IMET (\$)				-0.047* (0.026)							
IMET (Students)					-0.008*** (0.001)						
FMS (\$)						0.062* (0.037)					
FMS (Students)							0.002*** (0.001)				
FMF (\$)								0.089*** (0.032)			
FMF (Students)									0.005*** (0.001)		
Counter-Drug Training (\$)										-0.169*** (0.034)	
Counter-Drug (Students)											-0.001*** (0.0001)
GDP per Capita (log)	-0.38*** (0.15)	-0.013 (0.145)	-0.258** (0.125)	-0.197 (0.149)	-0.19 (0.143)	-0.326** (0.145)	-0.268** (0.114)	-0.327*** (0.122)	-0.340*** (0.112)	-0.233* (0.136)	-0.206 (0.134)
Population (log)	0.04 (0.131)	-0.14 (0.118)	0.039 (0.126)	-0.136 (0.120)	-0.13 (0.115)	0.056 (0.123)	-0.024 (0.118)	0.0004 (0.126)	0.06 (0.121)	-0.096 (0.112)	-0.126 (0.115)
Physical Integrity Rights Index	-0.81*** (0.08)	-0.78*** (0.08)	-0.847*** (0.083)	-0.779*** (0.083)	-0.761*** (0.0083)	-0.844*** (0.085)	-0.895*** (0.076)	-0.852** (0.078)	-0.875*** (0.074)	-0.772*** (0.084)	-0.798*** (0.082)
Region	0.50** (0.14)	0.424*** (0.135)	0.642*** (0.128)	0.531*** (0.13)	0.582*** (0.113)	-0.675*** (0.12)	0.661*** (0.116)	0.667*** (0.119)	0.665*** (0.117)	0.615*** (0.110)	0.628*** (0.115)

TABLE 2
(Continued)

IVs	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
Polity	0.075** (0.036)	0.117*** (0.035)	0.081** (0.034)	0.109*** (0.036)	0.107*** (0.034)	0.087** (0.034)	0.072** (0.033)	0.076** (0.033)	0.063** (0.032)	0.112 (0.034)	0.096*** (0.034)
MoC	-3.39*** (0.80)	-3.338*** (-0.703)	-3.336*** (0.787)	-3.446*** (0.787)	-3.277*** (0.63)	-3.379*** (0.735)	-3.196*** (0.628)	-3.412*** (0.773)	-3.465*** (0.849)	-3.411*** (0.704)	-3.33*** (0.662)
Prob > chi ²	103.7	104.27	103.95	103.59	112.06	103.03	124.59	107.95	123.02	115.50	108.51
#	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Nonzero #	2,549	2,549	2,549	2,549	2,549	2,549	2,549	2,549	2,549	2,549	2,549
	282	282	282	282	282	282	282	282	282	282	282

Note: Robust errors are reported in parentheses.

*** $p < .01$; ** $p < .05$; * $p < .1$.

TABLE 3
Impact of U.S. International Military Training and Education Programs on Civilian Atrocities (Continued)

IVs	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23
INL (\$)	-0.226*** (0.057)											
INL (Students)		-0.01*** (0.002)										
PME (\$)			-0.115 (0.082)									
PME (Students)				-0.002 (0.03)								
CTFP (\$)					0.081** (0.034)							
CTFP (Students)						-0.018*** (0.004)						
Reg Cen (\$)							0.032 (0.035)					
Reg Cen (Students)								0.01*** (0.004)				
UCEA (\$)									0.06* (0.033)			
UCEA (Students)										0.001 (0.002)		
EXG (\$)											-0.184 (0.119)	
EXG (Students)												-1.1*** (0.285)
GDP per Capita (l- og)	-0.226* (0.133)	-0.202 (0.133)	-0.213 (0.136)	-0.21 (0.135)	-0.241* (0.125)	-0.179 (0.14)	-0.213 (0.139)	-0.25** (0.120)	-0.234* (0.124)	-0.216 (0.134)	-0.208 (0.135)	-0.219 (0.134)
Population (log)	-0.133 (0.113)	-0.136 (0.114)	0.097 (0.120)	-0.118 (0.119)	0.055 (0.114)	-0.127 (0.120)	-0.114 (0.118)	-0.027 (0.120)	0.064 (0.122)	-0.111 (0.119)	-0.106 (0.119)	-0.111 (0.115)
Physical Integrity Rights Index	-0.782*** (0.081)	-0.80*** (0.081)	-0.79*** (0.083)	-0.791*** (0.083)	-0.82*** (0.087)	-0.80*** (0.081)	-0.78*** (0.083)	-0.81*** (0.082)	-0.84*** (0.083)	-0.80*** (0.086)	-0.79*** (0.083)	-0.79*** (0.083)

TABLE 3
(Continued)

	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23
Region	0.659*** (0.114)	0.64*** (0.114)	0.602*** (0.118)	0.617*** (0.117)	0.719*** (0.119)	0.575*** (0.117)	0.544*** (0.142)	0.681*** (0.118)	0.64*** (0.117)	0.624*** (0.117)	0.612*** (0.112)	0.622*** (0.114)
Polity	0.103*** (0.034)	0.097*** (0.034)	0.097*** (0.035)	0.092*** (0.035)	0.063* (0.036)	0.104** (0.035)	0.106*** (0.038)	0.67* (0.036)	0.086** (0.117)	0.09** (0.025)	0.092*** (0.035)	0.096*** (0.034)
MoC	-3.286*** (0.634)	-3.25*** (0.615)	-3.38*** (0.702)	-3.392*** (0.706)	-3.10** (0.673)	-3.35*** (0.669)	-3.39*** (0.705)	-3.48*** (0.791)	-3.44*** (0.761)	-3.403*** (0.718)	-3.39*** (0.707)	-3.36*** (0.689)
Prob > chi ²	108.58	112.35	101.64	100.21	105.77	109.37	101.03	107.50	103.70	100.40	101.55	108.12
#	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Nonzero #	2,549	2,549	2,549	2,549	2,549	2,549	2,549	2,549	2,549	2,549	2,549	2,549
	282	282	282	282	282	282	282	282	282	282	282	282

Note: Robust errors are reported in parentheses.

*** $p < .01$; ** $p < .05$; * $p < .1$.

example, is one of the largest customers of the U.S. defense industry, with \$29 billion of arms sales in 2012 alone.

The total amount of U.S. military aid, too, has a positive and statistically significant impact on civilian deaths, suggesting that greater amounts of overall U.S. military assistance are associated with more civilian atrocities committed by state security forces. Holding all other variables constant, the expected number of deaths increases by a factor of 1.06 (calculated as the exponential of the coefficient 0.06) for each unit increase in U.S. military assistance (measured in logged U.S. dollars per capita). The total dollars spent on FMF and students participating in the FMF program also show a positive and statistically significant impact on the civilian deaths. These findings are consistent across the models, where these measures are lagged by one and two years, respectively.

Supporting the assertions of its advocates, IMET is found to have a negative and statistically significant impact on civilian deaths, both in terms of the total dollars spent and the number of students participating in IMET. The latter finding suggests that the expected number of civilian deaths decreases by a ratio of 0.99 to 1 for every student participating in the IMET program. The INL and Counter-Drug Training Program produces statistically significant results on both the total dollars spent and the number of trainees, whereas two other individual programs—the Regional Defense Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program (CTFP) and the Joint Combined Exchange Training Program (EXG)—show statistically significant results on the total number of trainees. In all of these instances, the individual programs measured by dollars, students, or both, are found to be negatively associated with civilian casualties. The amounts spent on the Unified Command Engagement Activities Program (UCEA) and CTFP are found to be positively associated with the number of civilian deaths; these findings are also statistically significant. (See the Appendix for descriptions of these programs.)

Among the control variables, the Physical Integrity Rights Index is negatively associated with the dependent variable across all models, and this finding is statistically significant. Across all programs, the coefficient of physical integrity rights fluctuates from -0.76 to -0.88 , meaning that a one-unit increase in the Physical Integrity Rights index leads to 0.5 to 0.53 times decrease in the expected value of civilian atrocities. Simply put, a higher respect for physical integrity rights suggests fewer predicted civilian deaths. The positive and statistically significant coefficient on the region variable appears to be counterintuitive, as it suggests that, all else being equal, regions with higher mean Physical Integrity Rights index scores experience higher civilian casualties in situations of conflict. The

finding, however, makes sense in light of the overall distribution of casualties across regions. Africa has the highest mean number of casualties (102.59), followed by Europe (96.75), Asia (55.17), Latin America (2.39), Oceania (1.9), and North America (0); however, Europe is ranked above Asia, Latin America, and North America. The magnitude of conflict (MoC) variable is found to be a significant predictor of the excess of zeros in the data.

Lastly, the level of democracy, as measured by the Polity score, is highly statistically significant across all models and positively associated with the number of civilian deaths. One explanation for this counterintuitive finding is that in order for democracy to have a discernable impact on human rights, it has to pass a certain threshold on the democracy scale, becoming “mature.” Consistent with earlier research, only those states that score 8, 9, and 10 on the Polity democracy scale are considered full democracies and can be expected to have a pacifying impact on state repression.⁴³ To test for this possibility, we created a dummy democracy variable, with 1 standing for states coded 8 and above on the Polity scale and 0 otherwise. We reran several models replacing the Polity score with the binary measure of democracy, and the returned results supported our supposition. In these selected models, the direction and impact of the various measures of the U.S. military assistance did not change, whereas the sign on the democracy variable was reversed. In other words, we found that full democracies, as measured by Polity scores of 8, 9, and 10, can be expected to have fewer civilian atrocities in the context of broader political conflict.

Although previous research has shown that human rights are not the primary consideration in U.S. military aid allocation,⁴⁴ human rights performance might be a determinant of U.S. military assistance. In other words, it is possible that counties that participate in U.S. security assistance programs are selected on the basis of their compliance with human rights. If this were the case, endogeneity problems would be present in the models, causing serial correlation in the error terms. To test for the possibility of reverse causation, we performed selected treatment effect analysis to identify whether the endogenous variables of program participation had any effect on the magnitude of atrocities. For these tests, we recorded the treatment variable as binary scores: those states that participated in the

⁴³Christian Davenport and David A. Armstrong II, “Democracy and the Violation of Human Rights: A Statistical Analysis from 1976 to 1996,” *American Journal of Political Science* 48 (July 2004): 538–554.

⁴⁴Clair Apodaca and Michael Stohl, “United States Human Rights Policy and Foreign Assistance,” *International Studies Quarterly* 43 (March 1999): 185–198.

program (that is, received treatment) were recorded as 1, and those states that did not were recorded as 0. With the exception of the model testing the treatment effect of the total U.S. military assistance per capita, other models returned an insignificant Wald coefficient, signifying that there are likely no treatment effects on the magnitude of atrocities in the states receiving U.S. military assistance.

Furthermore, to assess whether the impact of U.S. military aid holds for the general human rights situation in the country, we reassessed all models using the CIRI human rights index as a dependent variable. Keeping in mind that the CIRI index of personal integrity rights and the measure of atrocities are conceptually different and uncorrelated (Pearson's $r = -0.15$), the results from the two sets of models can be interpreted as consistent overall. Across all models, the measures of U.S. military assistance produce a negative impact on CIRI human integrity scores, suggesting that various types of U.S. security assistance, measured in dollars or students trained, are negatively associated with respect for individual integrity rights in the recipient states. For several programs, including FMF, FMS, as well as the total amount of U.S. military assistance, these results support the findings reported earlier. For others, such as the Regional Centers for Security Studies Program (Reg Cen), Military Education Exchange Program (PME), Unified Command Engagement Activities Program (UCEA), and Joint Combined Exchange Training Program (EXG), the results are in the opposite direction but statistically insignificant.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

The goal of this article was to systematically examine the impact of U.S. security assistance programs on foreign militaries' respect for civilians' rights during periods of political instability calling for military involvement. Beyond IMET, FMS, and FMF, the article included many other U.S. security assistance programs and assessed their connection to furthering (or not) important U.S. policy goals. The statistical tests demonstrate that these programs do not have a uniform impact on human rights practices in the states that are recipients of U.S. military aid. Of the assessed programs, the total number of students trained under IMET, INL, CTFP, and EXG was found to be associated with fewer atrocities committed by the militaries of the states receiving U.S. military aid. The results of this analysis confirm that the relationship of U.S. security assistance programs to subsequent human rights is contingent on the nature of those programs. Based on this review, the main difference between the security assistance programs included here lies in the ways in which funds are allocated for

their execution and whether educational exchange and training constitutes an important element of the program.

As indicated by the foregoing results, FMS and FMF were found to be ineffective in inducing improvements in human rights. There are several features that distinguish these programs from other types of the U.S. foreign military support, and these features may help explain their negative association with subsequent human rights practices in situations of political conflict. First, sales of military equipment and hardware make up the bulk of the dollar amount of these programs, whereas the accompanying services and training are secondary and very technical in nature. Second, because states that procure U.S. military equipment pay for the sales out of their own budgets (or loan money to purchase the military weapons and hardware), the U.S. government has less influence and oversight over the nature of the sales, the choice of trainees, and the subsequent use of the military equipment compared with the grant-based programs funded out of the U.S. budget. It is not surprising, therefore, that the United States has sold military equipment, services, and training to a diverse population of states, some with poor records of human rights abuses.⁴⁵ While very recent changes to U.S. law seek to restrain the sale of arms to regions and states that would enhance the capabilities of those states to militarily engage their population, sales of equipment and training of personnel for countries with less than stellar human rights records and aggressive foreign policy continue under programs such as FMS and FMF.⁴⁶

There are, however, some positive and encouraging results. Broadly, as indicated in the Findings section, the programs, which are grant based and include elements of military training and exchange, are negatively associated with civilian deaths in situations of political conflict. The magnitude of these programs—that is, the total number of foreign officers brought for training in the U.S. military establishments or trained overseas or the dollar value of military equipment supplied to foreign governments—varies considerably from year to year and is contingent on annual budget appropriations in the United States. In other words, while some financial support from the states that are recipients of grant-based foreign military programs is expected, the programs are largely funded by the U.S. government. Beyond the funding mechanism, however, it is the deeper engagement of foreign officers in curricular and extracurricular activities that

⁴⁵McCoy, “Trained to Torture?”; Schultz, “U.S. Foreign Policy and Human Rights Violations”; and Stohl and Carleton, “The Foreign Policy of Human Rights.”

⁴⁶Irwin et al., “Foreign Military Sales: First Revision.”

help them learn, appreciate, and internalize important values, including respect for human rights, as well as greater opportunity for socialization with representatives of the U.S. Army, that distinguishes them from the FMS and FMF programs.

The results are closely tied to those of Atkinson's 2014 study, which indicated that U.S.-hosted military educational exchange programs were linked to positive improvements in democratic institutions.⁴⁷ The socialization model and the empirical analysis presented in Atkinson's book demonstrate how military educational exchanges foster goodwill, friendships, and social networks, in this way serving as important sources of knowledge, influence, and power. Building on these results, our findings suggest that security assistance programs that feature military education, training, and exchange are effective at inducing positive human rights developments in states that are recipients of the U.S. military aid by reducing civilian deaths by the hands of the military in times of political conflict.

An important policy implication is that the number of trainees supported by U.S. security assistance programs and the length of their education, training, and exchange are important determinants of their impact on subsequent human rights practices. One possible explanation for the statistically insignificant impact of the dollar amount of IMET on human rights casualties in situations of conflict is that despite a 70 percent increase in IMET funding since fiscal year 2000, the number of students trained decreased by nearly 14 percent as a result of increasing costs of the program. Still, what matters more for the effectiveness of the program is the number of students trained and the duration and nature of their training rather than the dollar amount spent on the program, as foreign military trainees need time to acquire and internalize the appropriate knowledge through socialization. A greater number of foreign military trainees who are given time to socialize and internalize democratic values is an important indicator of respect for human rights, especially in the most volatile situations.

⁴⁷Atkinson, *Military Soft Power*.

Appendix: Independent Variables Used in the Study

<i>Acronym</i>	<i>Variable</i>	<i>Description</i>
U.S. Military Aid	Total U.S. military assistance	Total U.S. military assistance per capita in a given year in constant 2005 U.S. dollars.
Total \$ (All Programs)	Amount of money allocated to Foreign Military and DOD Engagement Activities, All Programs	Total amount allocated to the Departments of State and Defense for all foreign military education and training activities during the year
Total Trainees (All Programs)	Number of Trained Foreign Military and DOD Engagement Students, All Programs	Total number of trainees from all programs funded by the Departments of State and Defense during the year.
IMET	International Military Education and Training Program	IMET program assists U.S. friends and allies in the professionalization of their militaries through participation in U.S. military educational programs.
FMS	Foreign Military Sales Program	FMS are government-to-government sales of U.S. defense equipment, services, and training.
FMF	Foreign Military Financing Program	FMF is designed for financing the acquisition of U.S. defense articles, services, and training through grants or loans.
Counter-Drug	Counter-Drug Training Support (CDTS) Program	CDTS includes deployments for training of foreign forces at the request of an appropriate law enforcement agency official; the purpose is to conduct counter-narcotics-related training of foreign military and law enforcement personnel.
INL	International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Program	INL supports policies and programs to stimulate more effective foreign political will and financial commitment, to strengthen foreign criminal justice sectors, and to promote concrete international cooperation.
PME	Military Education Exchange Program	Reciprocal professional military education exchanges are authorized by Section 544 (Exchange Training) of the Foreign Assistance Act; this section authorizes the president to provide for the attendance of foreign military personnel at PME institutions in the United States without charge, if such attendance is part of an international agreement.
CTFP	Regional Defense Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program	Department of Defense security cooperation program established to meet an emerging and urgent defense requirement to build partnerships through targeted, nonlethal combating terrorism education and training for mid- to senior-level international military officers, ministry of defense civilians, and security officials whose current or future responsibilities involve combating terrorism

(Continued)

(Continued)

<i>Acronym</i>	<i>Variable</i>	<i>Description</i>
Reg Cen	Regional Centers for Security Studies Program	Regional Centers have been established for all major regions of the world: (1) Africa Center for Strategic Studies; (2) Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies; (3) Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies; (4) George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies; (5) Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies. Each Regional Center tailors its program specifically to help meet the Secretary of Defense's key goals in each region. Common topics are regional security issues, defense planning, and civil-military relations.
UCEA	Unified Command Engagement Activities Program	Activities include Humanitarian Demining Programs that must enhance the readiness of participating U.S. forces, must benefit the civilian population in the intended country, and cannot normally be used for the military or police forces.
EXG	Joint Combined Exchange Training Program	Permits U.S. Special Operations Forces to train through interaction with foreign military forces. The primary purpose of Joint Combined Exchange Training Program activities is always the training of U.S. Special Operations personnel, although incidental training benefits may accrue to the foreign friendly forces.
MoC	Magnitude of Conflict	Represents total magnitude of all (societal and interstate) major episodes of political violence. Taken from the Major Episodes of Political Violence (MEPV) and Conflict Regions data set, the MoC index may range from 0 (no episodes of violence) to 60 (highest magnitude on several episodes of domestic and international political violence).
GDP per Capita	GDP per capita	GDP per capita using constant 2005 prices in U.S. dollars. A log of the variable is used in the equation.
Population Physical Integrity Index	Country's population, both genders Cingranelli and Richards Physical Integrity Rights Index	Logged country population. The index ranges from 0 (no government respect for the basic integrity rights, which include prohibition of torture, extrajudicial killing, political imprisonment, and disappearance) to 8 (full government respect for these rights).
Region	UN region identifier	Rank-ordered from 1 to 6 using means of their Physical Integrity Rights scores: 6 = Oceania (mean = 7.18), 5 = Europe (mean = 6.59), 4 = North America (mean = 6.41), (3 = Latin America (mean = 5.07), 2 = Africa (mean = 4.14), 1 = Asia (mean = 3.78).