

RESEARCH ARTICLE

Democratic or cultural peace? Examining the joint democratic peace proposition through the lens of shared emancipative values

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Abstract

Is it joint democracy or state similarity that has a pacifying impact on interstate relations? This study explores the complementarity of the two propositions and demonstrates the potential of a particular kind of shared emancipative culture embracing values of autonomy, equality, choice, and voice to amplify the impact of joint democracy on interstate conflict. The data on cultural values, which comes from the World Values Survey, was integrated with the data from the Correlates of War Project to test the impact of joint democracy and cultural similarity on militarised interstate disputes (1981–2010). We find that culturally similar dyads are less likely to be involved in conflict with each other than culturally dissimilar dyads. Although, cultural similarity does not wash out the pacifying effect of democracy, it offers a complementary explanation to the democratic peace. We also find that states that are democratic and share higher than average scores on the emancipative values are less likely to engage in militarised interstate disputes than democratic states, which are culturally dissimilar or score low on the emancipative dimensions. This provides support for an additional normative/cultural impact on democratic peace.

Keywords: Democratic Peace; Culture; Emancipative Values

Introduction

The chances of war are significantly reduced in the relations of democratic states. Democracies interact more peacefully with each other than do non-democratic or mixed pairs of states.¹ Theoretical arguments designed to explain why democracies do not fight each other have been based on the Kantian idea of perpetual peace among liberal states, shared norms of compromise and peaceful conflict resolution, and the presence of restraining democratic institutions that prevent inter-democratic wars. Critics of the democratic peace thesis have challenged it on the

¹William J. Dixon, 'Democracy and the peaceful settlement of international conflict', *American Political Science Review*, 88:2 (1994), pp. 14–32; Zeev Maoz, 'The controversy over the democratic peace: Rearguard action or cracks in the wall?', *International Security*, 22:1 (1997), pp. 162–98; Zeev Maoz and Nasrin Abdoladi, 'Regime types and international conflict, 1816–1976', *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 33:1 (1989), pp. 3–5; Zeev Maoz and Bruce Russett, 'Normative and structural causes of the democratic peace, 1946–1986', *American Political Science Review*, 87:3 (1993), pp. 624–38; John R. Oneal and James Lee Ray, 'New tests of the democratic peace controlling for economic interdependence, 1950–1985', *Political Research Quarterly*, 50:4 (1997), pp. 751–75; Bruce Russett and John R. Oneal, *Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations* (New York: Norton, 2001); Melvin Small and J. David Singer, 'The war proneness of democratic regimes, 1816–1965', *The Jerusalem Journal of International Relations*, 1:1 (1976), pp. 49–69; Spencer Weart, 'Remarks on the ancient evidence for the democratic peace', *Journal of Peace Research*, 38:5 (2001), pp. 609–13; Erich Weede, 'Democracy and war involvement', *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 28 (1984), pp. 649–63.

grounds that some other factors – territorial stability, capitalist economy, interdependence, and globalisation – confound the joint democratic peace.² It has also been argued that inter-democratic peace is a consequence of political or broader cultural similarity rather than joint democracy, and peace among like regimes is not limited to democratic states.³ The ‘autocratic peace’ literature, for example, has shown that mixed democratic–autocratic dyads were more conflict prone than either jointly democratic or jointly autocratic dyads.⁴ These arguments suggest a distinct and broader theoretical formulation that makes the democratic peace thesis endogenous to cultural variation in the international system.⁵

Is it joint democracy or cultural similarity that has a pacifying impact on inter-state relations? We purport that the two propositions about the cultural impact are complementary in explaining inter-democratic conduct. Further, we explore the potential of shared emancipative values of personal autonomy, equality of opportunity, respect for individual choices, and voice in community decisions⁶ to act as an explanatory force of the democratic peace. The culture that embraces these values is not coterminous with democracy, but is both prior to and necessary for the emergence of democratic institutions and norms. The theory posited in this study is one of causal complexity in which the outcome of conflict can result from multiple combinations of conditions.⁷

We conceptualise culture as transmitted patterns of values and beliefs that members of a given society come to share. The benefits of using emancipative values for the purpose of testing the impact of cultural similarity and joint democracy are twofold. First, emancipative values, similarly to many democratic principles, are an outcome of ‘enlightenment humanism’ reflected in the writings of Kant, Hume, Locke, Smith, Madison, Jefferson, Hamilton, and Mill, among others.⁸ Although different from democratic norms, emancipative values are associated with the habits of peaceful resolution of differences and compromise and can, therefore, be used as a proxy in the tests of the normative explanation of democratic peace. Second, emancipative values capture salient cultural variation across states and societies and can, therefore, be used for testing the impact of cultural similarities and differences on peace in state dyads. The data on the

²Katherine Barbieri, ‘International Trade and Conflict: The Debatable Relationship’, 35th Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, Minneapolis, MN, 18–21 March, 1998; Nathaniel Beck, Jonathan Katz, and Richard Tucker, ‘Taking time seriously in binary time-series-cross-section analysis’, *American Journal of Political Science*, 42:1 (1998), pp. 1260–88; Seung-Whan Choi, ‘Beyond Kantian liberalism: Peace through globalization?’, *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, 27:3 (2010), pp. 272–95; Erik Gartzke, ‘The capitalist peace’, *American Journal of Political Science*, 51:1 (2007), pp. 166–91; Douglas M. Gibler, *The Territorial Peace* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012); Nils Petter Gleditsch and Håvard Hegre, ‘Peace and democracy: Three levels of analysis’, *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 41:2 (1997), pp. 283–310; Michael Mousseau, ‘The democratic peace unraveled: It’s the economy’, *International Studies Quarterly*, 57:1 (2013), pp. 186–97.

³D. Scott Bennett, ‘Towards a continuous specification of the democracy-autocracy connection’, *International Studies Quarterly*, 50:2 (2006), pp. 513–37; Gleditsch and Hegre, ‘Peace and democracy’; Errol Anthony Henderson, ‘The democratic peace through the lens of culture, 1820–1989’, *International Studies Quarterly*, 42:3 (1998), pp. 461–84; Ido Oren and Jude Hays, ‘Democracies may rarely fight one another, but developed socialist states rarely fight at all’, *Alternatives: Social Transformation and Humane Governance*, 22:4 (1997), pp. 493–521; Mark Peceny, Caroline C. Beer, and Shannon Sanchez-Terry, ‘Dictatorial peace?’, *American Political Science Review*, 96:1 (2002), pp. 15–26; Brenda Shaffer (ed.), *The Limits of Culture: Islam and Foreign Policy* (Cambridge: the MIT Press, 2006).

⁴Bennett, ‘Towards a continuous specification’; Gleditsch and Hegre, ‘Peace and democracy’; Peceny, Beer, and Sanchez-Terry, ‘Dictatorial peace?’.

⁵Bennett, ‘Towards a continuous specification’; Bethany Lacina and Charlotte Lee, ‘Cultural clash or democratic peace? Results of a survey experiment on the effect of religious culture and regime type on foreign policy opinion formation’, *Foreign Policy Analysis*, 9 (2013), p. 148.

⁶Christian Welzel, *Freedom Rising: Human Empowerment and the Quest for Emancipation* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013).

⁷Charles C. Ragin, *The Comparative Method: Moving Beyond Qualitative and Quantitative Strategies* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987).

⁸Steven Pinker, *The Better Angels of Our Nature* (New York: Viking Penguin, 2011), p. 180.

emancipative values come from the World Values Survey (WVS), which investigates social, cultural, and political changes worldwide. In addition to the WVS data, this study utilises the data from the Correlates of War Project.⁹

We begin with an overview of the two theoretical paths of the cultural impact on interstate relations and discussion of how cultural similarity and shared emancipative values account for democratic comity. Next, we present the research design of the study and the findings of the statistical analysis. We conclude with a discussion of the results.

Culture and democracy: Causal pathways to inter-democratic peace

According to the normative proposition of the democratic peace theory, liberal ideology or the shared norms of democratic compromise prevent democracies from fighting one another.¹⁰ Democracies externalise these domestic norms, therefore avoiding conflicts and interventions in relations with other democracies.¹¹ This line of reasoning emphasises a distinctive set of norms that guide democratic states' conduct in relations with each other. The sources of these norms can be found in liberal ideology¹² or culture that is central to the normative explanations of democratic peace, also known as the 'cultural' accounts of democratic comity.¹³

This emphasis on the *internal* differences between democratic and autocratic states that bear important implications for their *international* behaviour also conceals a possibility that it is the similarity of democracies with regard to their respect of individual liberties at home that shape their behaviour abroad. These conventions of mutual respect have formed a cooperative foundation for relations among liberal democracies.¹⁴ Yet, the same liberal ideology that distinguishes democracies from autocratic states may also be a source of conflict among them, as democratic regimes embark on the liberating crusade to safeguard the rights of citizens who are oppressed by autocratic regimes. Aware of such 'liberal imperialism', non-democratic states may respond with force to prevent the possibility of liberal intervention.¹⁵

Thus, the democratic peace literature offers two culture-centered mechanisms explaining democratic comity. First, cultural predispositions toward peaceful conflict resolution reduce the chance of dispute escalation between two democratic states. Second, cultural affinity eliminates important bones of contention over the management of domestic issues, thus reducing the

⁹Glenn Palmer, Vito D'Orazio, Michael Kenwick, and Matthew Lane, 'The Mid4 Dataset, 2002–2010: Procedures, coding rules and description', *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, 32 (2015), pp. 222–42; Zeev Maoz, Paul L. Johnson, Jasper Kaplan, Fiona Ogunkoya, and Aaron Shreve, 'The dyadic Militarized Interstate Disputes (MIDs) Dataset Version 3.0: Logic, characteristics, and comparisons to alternative datasets', *Journal of Conflict Resolution* (2018), available at: doi: <http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0022002718784158>.

¹⁰Michael W. Doyle, 'Kant, liberal legacies, and foreign affairs', *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, 12:3 (1983), pp. 205–35; Maoz and Russett, 'Normative and structural causes'.

¹¹Sabastian Rosato, 'The flawed logic of democratic peace theory', *American Political Science Review*, 97:4 (2003), pp. 585–602.

¹²Doyle, 'Kant, liberal legacies, and foreign affairs'.

¹³Bruce Russett, William Antholis, Carol R. Ember, Melvin Ember, and Zeev Maoz, *Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993); Bruce Russett and Harvey Starr, 'From democratic peace to Kantian peace: Democracy and conflict in the international system', in Manus I. Midlarsky (ed.), *Handbook of War Studies II* (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2000), pp. 92–128.

¹⁴Russett et al., *Grasping the Democratic Peace*; Russett and Starr, 'From democratic peace to Kantian peace'.

¹⁵Spencer R. Weart, *Never at War: Why Democracies Will Not Fight One Another* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998); Suzanne Werner, 'The effects of political similarity on the onset of militarized disputes, 1816–1985', *Political Research Quarterly*, 53:2 (2000), pp. 343–74. There is also an argument that an increasing number of democracies in the international system may trigger a counter-reaction from autocratic regimes accompanied by the rise in militarised disputes between democracies and autocracies over the spread of democracy worldwide (James Lee Ray, 'Democracy on the level(s): Does democracy correlate with peace?', in John A. Vasquez (ed.), *What Do We Know about War?* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000), pp. 299–316; James Lee Ray, 'Integrating levels of analysis in world politics', *Journal of Theoretical Politics*, 13:4 (2001), pp. 355–88).

possibility of conflict emergence in the first place. These two propositions have been used to explain the ‘Janus-faced’ nature of democracies, which are no less likely to fight non-democratic states, but nevertheless avoid wars with each other.¹⁶

We purport that the two propositions about the cultural impact are complementary in accounting for democratic states’ conduct.¹⁷ This complementarity extends beyond the ‘division of labor’ whereby cultural similarity reduces possible issues of contention between democracies, while the norms of peaceful conflict resolution prevent an existing dispute’s escalation to war. Rather, we posit that the shared norms of conflict resolution and culture jointly influence each stage of inter-state relations by affecting inferences and preferences of publics and elites. The impact of shared norms of conciliation, for example, can be dampened by the presence of cultural biases, while cultural similarities may inform the perceptions of state regime. Further, we theorise the norms and principles associated with the peaceful conduct of democracies and trace explanations of democratic peace to shared ‘emancipative culture’, that is, a culture that highly values personal autonomy, equality of opportunity, respect for individual choices, and voice in community decisions.¹⁸ In the remainder of this section we elaborate on these arguments.

Scholars from different disciplines have pointed out strong correlation between societies’ cultural orientations and their institutional formats. Predispositions toward in-group favouritism, kinship ties, and rigid norms, found in ‘collectivistic’¹⁹ or ‘tight’²⁰ cultures tend to favour authoritarian institutions, while ‘loose’ cultures supporting inter-group exchange and individual creativity give rise to liberal institutions and norms.²¹ In these studies on human development, political institutions were found to be interlinked with peoples’ underlying beliefs and values. ‘For democracy only becomes effective after ordinary people have acquired the resources that make them capable to practice freedoms and after they have internalized the values that make them willing to practice freedom.’²² According to this scholarship, culture informs the nature of political order, and is also shaped and reinforced by political institutions and norms.

At the societal level, culture performs several interrelated cognitive and evaluative functions.²³ First, it serves as a communication device that fosters individual and group interactions in the first place providing a framework of shared and collective meanings. In liberal democracies, for example, citizens share beliefs in personal autonomy and inalienable rights. They also hold strong

¹⁶Thomas Risse-Kappen, ‘Democratic peace – warlike democracies? A social constructivist interpretation of the liberal argument’, *European Journal of International Relations*, 1:4 (1995), p. 491. The phenomenon of democratic peace among warlike democracies has been traced to different strands of liberal theory that contributed to the ambivalence of liberal democratic norms. The latter, on the one hand, call for the protection of popular sovereignty, and, on the other, the global promotion of liberal norms, even by force (for further discussion, see Michael W. Doyle, ‘Liberalism and world politics’, *American Political Science Review*, 80:4 (1986), pp. 1151–69).

¹⁷Werner, in ‘The effects of political similarity’, similarly, argues for complementarity of the similarity and shared norms propositions.

¹⁸Welzel, *Freedom Rising*.

¹⁹Eunkook Suh, Ed Diener, Shigehiro Oishi, and Harry C. Triandis, ‘The shifting basis of life satisfaction judgments across cultures: Emotions versus norms’, *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 74 (1998), pp. 494–512.

²⁰Michele J. Gelfand, Beng-Chong Lim, and Jana L. Raver, ‘Culture and accountability in organizations: Variations in forms of social control across cultures’, *Human Resource Management Review*, 14 (2004), pp. 135–60; Geert Hofstede, *Culture’s Consequences: International Differences in Work-Related Values* (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1980).

²¹For further discussion, see Christian Welzel, ‘Evolution, empowerment, and emancipation: How societies climb the freedom ladder’, *World Development*, 64 (2014), pp. 33–51.

²²Russell J. Dalton and Christian Welzel, ‘Political culture and value change’, in Russel J. Dalton and Christian Welzel (eds), *The Civic Culture Transformed: From Allegiant to Assertive Citizens* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), p. 10.

²³See also Peter J. Katzenstein, ‘Introduction: Alternative perspectives on national security’, in Peter J. Katzenstein (ed.), *Cultural Norms and National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), pp. 1–32.

(if simplified) expectations about other countries that inform their perceptions of and interactions with citizens of those states.²⁴ Second, socio-cognitive cues linked to the shared cultural understandings enable categorisations and judgements. Learning about human rights abuses in another state, for instance, may trigger its categorisation as a culturally backward ‘other’. Confronting information that cues perceptions of a group-orientated culture may inform expectations of conciliatory behaviour from individuals, groups, and states ascribed with these cultural beliefs.²⁵ Cultures also act as motivational devices: cultural values are important sources of individuals’ attitudes that can affect their subsequent decisions and behaviour towards the world around them.

Implicit in the explanations of democratic peace are the propositions about ways, in which national leaders and citizens of democratic states use information about the regime type of a foreign state for making their preferences and decisions about bilateral relations.²⁶ Information about a regime type, however, is not always explicitly communicated or accessible to the public. The latter forms perceptions about other states on the basis of snippets of past and present information and the pre-existing sociocultural associations, which trigger schematic and, often, stereotypical inferences about other countries. Individuals use these inferences for drawing associations between their own and foreign states.²⁷ Perceiving the target nation as similar or dissimilar carries over to its perception as democratic or non-democratic because individuals can make inferences about one variable on the basis of another.²⁸ Further, culturally similar states typically receive more positive associations, while culturally dissimilar states may be labelled with negative out-group labels. This in-group/out-group distinction is further embedded with subjective evaluations about the ‘goodness’ of the in-group members and the ‘bad’ or threatening nature of the out-group states. These subjective judgements are used to justify differential treatment of the in-group and out-group: the in-group members deserve better treatment, while the out-group members can be subjected to violent force.²⁹

In this way, perceptions of cultural similarity may prevent conflict in state dyads where one or both nations may lack democratic credentials due to the fact that the leaders and publics of these states identify their nations as part of the same in-group and, therefore, worthy of cooperation. Conversely, cultural biases may impede the construction of normative affinities and, therefore, constitute a barrier to peaceful resolution of disputes involving democratic states. The breakup of Yugoslavia in 1991, for example, was mired in a series of brutal wars and entailed multiple territorial disputes that never escalated into the full-fledged fighting. The two former republics of Yugoslavia, Slovenia and Croatia, declared their independence in June 1991, but Slovenia, which spared a large-scale and protracted war with the Yugoslav People’s Army, was able to establish a multi-party representative democracy earlier than its neighbour, Croatia. The Croatian War of Independence was fought for four years and delayed democratisation by nearly a decade. Throughout the 1990s, Slovenian-Croatian relations deteriorated over the maritime border in the

²⁴Valerie M. Hudson, ‘Cultural expectations of one’s own and other nations’ foreign policy action templates’, *Political Psychology*, 20:4 (1999), pp. 767–801.

²⁵In a cross-national study of cooperation, Dorrough and Glöckner (2016) found that the participants from all nations expected most cooperation from the Japanese based on a strong stereotype of a group-orientated culture (Angela Dorrough and Andreas Glöckner, ‘Multi-national investigation of cross-societal cooperation’, *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences*, 113:39 (2016), pp. 10836–841).

²⁶Lacina and Lee, ‘Cultural clash or democratic peace?’.

²⁷*Ibid.*, pp. 143–70; Nehemia Geva and D. Christopher Hanson, ‘Cultural similarity, foreign policy actions, and regime perception: an experimental study of international cues and democratic peace’, *Political Psychology*, 20:4 (1999), pp. 803–27.

²⁸Geva and Hanson, ‘Cultural similarity’.

²⁹Laura Neack, *The New Foreign Policy: Complex Interactions, Competing Interests*, New Millennium Books in International Studies (3rd edn, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2013), p. 98; Black M. Riek, Erik W. Mania, and Samuel L. Gaertner, ‘Intergroup threat and outgroup attitudes: a meta-analytic review’, *Personality and Social Psychology Review*, 10 (2006), pp. 336–53.

Gulf of Piran.³⁰ Despite the politicisation of the conflict by both sides and a stronger military potential of the less-democratic party of the conflict, Croatia, the two states avoided militarisation of the territorial dispute and eventually agreed to submit it to arbitration. While no single factor is sufficient to explain the absence of war between Croatia and Slovenia during that time, the cultural similarities rooted in shared religion (Catholicism), beliefs in greater autonomy and economic prosperity, and animosity toward the Serbs (the shared 'out-group') turned these republics into important in-group members.³¹

The democratic peace researchers also pointed out multiple examples of militarised disputes, in which cultural biases washed out the conflict dampening impact of joint democracy.³² The Philippine-American War of 1899, for example, which pitted the United States against the First Philippine Republic, was explained by the presence of 'Western ethnocentric attitudes' that vitiated democratic constraints on US foreign policy towards a democratic, but culturally dissimilar, adversary.³³ Cultural differences have reinforced disputes between Israelis and Palestinians as well as the conflict between India and Pakistan.³⁴

Not every culture embraces values of peace, toleration of differences, and mediation. From a cultural standpoint, norms that emphasise respect for individual rights, tolerance of differences, rational debate, and negotiation stem from liberal principles about individuals' autonomy and ability to define and pursue their interests in self-preservation and material well-being.³⁵ Freedom is required for the pursuit of these interests, and peace is a prerequisite for freedom. Since violence and coercion are inimical to freedom, individuals are predisposed to value peace.³⁶ These liberal predispositions are expected to have a limiting effect by excluding war from the full range of logically possible solutions to an inter-democratic dispute, which gets resolved by peaceful means.³⁷ Other cultures, however, may comport with fascist regimes valorising aggressive war or other totalitarian ideologies encouraging contest for authority. Even when shared in a state dyad, these cultures may be conducive to war. Therefore, formal similarity does not fully account for democratic comity.

Previous research has shown that societies embracing the so-called 'emancipative values' are more likely to enjoy higher levels of democracy³⁸ and interpersonal trust associated with the decline of inter-state conflict.³⁹ These societies are also more likely to have higher levels of tolerance towards minorities⁴⁰ and experience a reduction in both domestic and international violence.⁴¹ Emancipative values embrace two orientations: a liberating orientation that

³⁰Marko Zajc, 'The Slovenian-Croatian border: History, representations, inventions', *Acta Histriae*, 23:3 (2015), pp. 499–510.

³¹Dejan Jović, *Yugoslavia: A State that Withered Away* (West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press, 2009); John R. Lampe, *Yugoslavia as History: Twice There Was a Country* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Sabrina P. Ramet, *The Disintegration of Yugoslavia From The Death of Tito To The Fall Of Milosevic* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2002).

³²Henderson, 'The democratic peace'.

³³Henderson, 'The democratic peace'; Bruce Martin Russett, *Grasping the Democratic Peace* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994).

³⁴Michael H. Hunt, *Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1987).

³⁵Michael W. Doyle, 'Three pillars of the liberal peace', *American Political Science Review*, 99:3 (2005), pp. 463–6.

³⁶John M. Owen, 'How liberalism produces democratic peace', *International Security*, 19:2 (1994), pp. 87–125.

³⁷Alastair I. Johnston, 'Thinking about strategic culture', *International Security*, 19:4 (1995), pp. 32–64.

³⁸Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel, 'Political culture and democracy: Analyzing cross-level linkages', *Comparative Politics*, 36:1 (2003), pp. 61–79.

³⁹Andris Zimelis, 'Trust and normative democratic peace theory: Nexus between citizens and foreign policies?', *International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy*, 32:1/2 (2012), pp. 17–28.

⁴⁰Robert Andersen and Tina Fetner, 'Economic inequality and intolerance: Attitudes toward homosexuality in 35 democracies', *American Journal of Political Science*, 52:4 (2008), pp. 942–58; Amy C. Alexander and Christian Welzel, 'Empowering women', *Sociological Review*, 27 (2010), pp. 364–84.

⁴¹Christian Welzel and Franziska Deutsche, 'Emancipative values and non-violent protest: the importance of "ecological" effects', *British Journal of Political Science*, 42:2 (2012), pp. 465–79; Ronald F. Inglehart, Bi Puranen, and Christian Welzel,

emphasises the freedom of choice, and an egalitarian orientation that stresses equality in realising one's freedoms and choices, thus leading to greater tolerance of dissent and non-conformity.⁴² Societies with prevalent emancipative values have evinced decreased readiness of individuals to scarify their life in wars.⁴³ Growing aversion to the loss of human lives has been regarded 'a natural byproduct of rising pro-choice values: when large parts of a population begin to see life no longer as a source of threats but as a source of opportunities, sacrificing lives increasingly seems an intolerable waste of human potential.'⁴⁴ As a result, individuals willingness to fight in wars dwindles as emancipative values spread. The latter causal mechanism is different from the pacifying impact of democratic norms. A desire for global peace among the like-minded democratic states has, on occasion, given rise to liberating crusades. Emancipative values, on the other hand, spurn any kind of conflict. Societies embracing emancipative norms are reluctant to accept the loss of human life in wars for any cause.

By reducing people's willingness to fight wars, emancipative values produce a 'monadic' impact of emancipative culture. In this causal mechanisms, perceptions of other states as culturally similar are not necessary for triggering the limiting effect of emancipative values on the warlike conduct of states that share them. Still, the limiting effect of emancipative values on warlike conduct will be greatest in the dyads of states that share them. In the mixed-culture dyads, escalation of conflict into war is possible as nations embracing values compatible with war may resort to or threaten military force as a means of conflict resolution prompting self-defence by the states, in which cultural values are loath to military force.

To conclude, cultural similarity in state dyads is linked to socio-cognitive mechanisms of the formation of judgement and perceptions resulting in sentiments of amity or affinity between two states, thus reducing the chances of war between them. Conversely, cultural dissimilarity leads to perceptions of bias that may result in impediments to peaceful conflict resolution. Formal cultural similarity, however, is insufficient to explain differences in the levels of conflict in inter-democratic, mixed, and non-democratic pairs of states. In particular to outcomes of peace, the shared cultures must be based in emancipative values. In addition to, but also separate from, joint democracy has been demonstrated to increase the probability of peace among states both theoretically and empirically. While both cultural similarity and joint democracy are independently theorised to facilitate outcomes of peace, it is also reasonable to assume that the existence of both cultural similarity and joint democracy within a dyad might further reduce the probability of conflict outcomes among the respective states. Figure 1 provides a visual representation of the three causal pathways.

The theory posited in this manuscript is one of causal complexity in which the outcome of conflict (Y) results from multiple combinations of conditions (X_1 = level of cultural similarity, X_2 = existence of joint democracy; X_3 = shared emancipative culture).⁴⁵ We presented three causal pathways to the outcomes of conflict.⁴⁶ Put succinctly, the premise of conjunctural causation suggests that dyads without shared culture have higher probability for conflict and, as a separate effect, dyads that are not jointly democracy have higher probability for conflict. It also

'Declining willingness to fight for one's country: the individual-level basis of the long peace', *Journal of Peace Research*, 52:4 (2015), pp. 418–34.

⁴²Welzel, *Freedom Rising*.

⁴³Inglehart, Bi Puranen, and Welzel, 'Declining willingness to fight for one's country'.

⁴⁴Welzel, *Freedom Rising*, p. 71. See also Inglehart, Puranen, and Welzel, 'Declining willingness to fight for one's country'.

⁴⁵Ragin, *The Comparative Method*.

⁴⁶For the sake of parsimony, other variables known to influence outcomes of interstate conflict such as contiguity are not modelled in this causal explanation, but are included in the empirical testing of these premises. Conjunctural causation mathematically allows for the inclusion of multiple independent variables with presumed additive effects on the dependent variable and can explain these probabilities in terms of marginal impact changes (Bear F. Braumoeller, 'Causal complexity and the study of politics', *Political Analysis*, 11:3 (2003), pp. 209–33.




Figure 1. Impact of cultural similarity, emancipative culture, and democracy on conflict.

suggests that when both shared culture and joint democracy are missing from the dyad, the probability for conflict is higher.

For many democratic peace scholars, cultural explanations are essentially structural state-level explanations. State culture overrides exogenous differences in leaders' beliefs, which become theoretically insignificant.⁴⁷ Others, however, have focused on the role of elite level norms⁴⁸ and suggested that differences between leaders in democratic states may condition the impact of democratic culture.⁴⁹ We rely on assumptions and findings of value research that has confirmed an 'ecological effect' of values when those are prevalent in the society.⁵⁰ To use the language of statistics, each state, even with heterogeneous cultural traditions, will have central tendencies or 'means' of cultural beliefs with a greater or lesser variance characterising the distribution of these beliefs in the population. Prevalent values become intuitively known to large segments of the society through different forms of communication, which, in turn generates a 'mental climate' felt by the members of the society. This mental climate constitutes state culture.⁵¹

As products of their culture, state decision-makers are the bearers of the salient cultural predispositions characterising the rest of the society, regardless of the directional relationship of cultural influences between the public and political elites. Both democratic and authoritarian political systems are sustained by legitimacy. Democratic legitimacy has been associated with various procedural mechanisms, but also a degree of congruence between the fundamental values, worldviews, and patterns of conduct espoused by the political system, including political elites, and by the population.⁵² Authoritarian regimes have used state-controlled public and private informational space to foster certain ways of thinking in the citizens, and create possibilities for their support for and compliance with the policies of ruling administrations.⁵³ These discursive legitimisation strategies often include appeals to the broader ideology, history, and

⁴⁷Russett and Starr, 'From democratic peace to Kantian peace'.

⁴⁸Bruce Russett, *Controlling the Sword* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990); Maoz and Russett, 'Normative and structural causes'.

⁴⁹Margaret G. Hermann and Charles W. Kegley, 'Rethinking democracy and international peace: Perspectives from political psychology', *International Studies Quarterly*, 39:4 (1995), pp. 511–33; Miriam Fendius Elman (ed.), *Paths to Peace: Is Democracy the Answer?* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997).

⁵⁰Shalom H. Schwartz, 'Value orientations: Measurement, antecedents and consequences across nations', in Roger Jowell, Caroline Roberts, Rory Fitzgerald, and Gillian Eva (eds), *Measuring Attitudes Cross-Nationally* (London: Sage, 2007), pp. 161–93.

⁵¹Welzel and Deutsche, 'Emancipative values and non-violent protest'.

⁵²John E. Fossum, 'Charters and constitution making: Comparing the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the European Charter of Fundamental Rights', in Gerald Kernerman and Philip Resnick (eds), *Insiders and Outsiders: Alan Cairns and the Reshaping of Canadian Citizenship* (Toronto: University of British Columbia Press, 2005), pp. 148–64.

⁵³Alexander Dukalskis, *The Authoritarian Public Sphere: Legitimation and Autocratic Power in North Korea, Burma, and China* (London and New York: Routledge, 2017).

culture, in addition to the superior decision-making and moral qualities of the ruling elite.⁵⁴ Research has found a high degree of cultural congruence between political elites' and citizens' values and opinion in the authoritarian states.⁵⁵

Research design

Measuring culture by emancipative values

This study adopts a widely accepted understanding of culture as shared values, norms, beliefs, and attitudes that relate to social and political relations and context.⁵⁶ Despite variations in the terminology and emphasis found in the wide spectrum of definitions of culture, they all point out the existence of shared meanings that provide a degree of order and direction with regard to the individual and group conception of the relationship with their social and political enforcement.⁵⁷

To measure culture, we chose a set of individual predispositions toward *autonomy*, *choice*, *equality*, and *voice* known as emancipative values. With their roots in the Enlightenment principles and ideas of humanism, emancipative values are comparable with democratic norms, but not synonymous with those. Some modern democratic states such as South Korea, the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, and the Republic of Georgia, to name but a few, are recognised democracies with less prevalent emancipative values.⁵⁸ Emancipative values are broader in their content than democracy. Their egalitarian dimension, for example, is broadly comparable with not only liberal, but also socialist, communist, libertarian, and other philosophies and traditions. Extreme egalitarianism can lead to mob rule threatening the institutions of democracy, while some non-egalitarian practices, particularly those concerning race and gender, are still common in democratic states.

Emancipative values are also suitable for cross-cultural comparisons, although they are not the only measures of the salient cultural differences and similarities between societies. A different and commonly used cultural typology classifies cultures into collectivistic and individualistic ones.⁵⁹ Other scholars have devised the measures of cultural 'embeddedness' and 'autonomy'⁶⁰ and the 'tightness' vs 'looseness' of cultures depending on how they tolerate deviant behaviour.⁶¹ Emancipative values tap the same salient societal differences as other measures of culture, but they have been found to capture these differences better on various indicators of economic development, technological advancement, and democratic achievements.⁶² Emancipative values, therefore, are the preferable measure of culture.

We use the World Values Survey as the main source of data on emancipative values. Our analysis is performed on data from the WVS waves 1981–4, 1990–4, 1995–8, 2000–04, 2005–09, as well as the 2010 data from the WVS wave 2010–14. Not all countries participate in the WVS, and not all countries are included in each subsequent wave. A total of 159 countries are included into the analysis, but not all of these states appear in dyads with one another. Some countries

⁵⁴Peter Burnell, 'Autocratic opening to democracy: Why legitimacy matters', *Third World Quarterly*, 27:4 (2006), pp. 545–62; Robert Mayer, 'Strategies of justification in authoritarian ideology', *Journal of Political Ideologies*, 6:2 (2001), pp. 147–68.

⁵⁵Dukalskis, *The Authoritarian Public Sphere*; Mariya Y. Omelicheva, 'Authoritarian legitimation: Assessing discourses of legitimacy in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan', *Central Asian Survey*, 15 (2016), pp. 481–500.

⁵⁶Michael Sodaro, *Comparative Politics: A Global Introduction* (New York: McGraw Hill, 2004), p. 256.

⁵⁷Alistair I. Johnson, 'Thinking about strategic culture', *International Security*, 19:4 (1995), pp. 32–64; Hudson, 'Cultural expectations'.

⁵⁸Fewer than 50 per cent of population in these states embrace emancipative values.

⁵⁹Gelfand, Lim, and Raver, 'Culture and accountability in organizations'; Suh *et al.*, 'The shifting basis'.

⁶⁰Lilach Sagiv and Shalom H. Schwartz, 'Cultural values in organization: Insights for Europe', *European Journal of International Management*, 1:3 (2007), pp. 176–90.

⁶¹Michele Gelfand, Jana L. Raver, Lisa Nishii, Lisa M. Leslie, Janetta Lun, Beng Chong Lim, ... Susumu Yamaguchi, 'Differences between tight and loose cultures', *Science*, 332:6033 (2011), pp. 1100–04.

⁶²Welzel, *Freedom Rising*, pp. 83–4.

appear in dyadic observations of the sample more often than others.⁶³ To increase our sample and thus reliability of our results, values for the emancipatory indices for the first wave of the survey (WVS 1981–4), in which questions used in the construction of indices of emancipative values were either not asked or indices were not calculated, were imputed using multiple imputation techniques.⁶⁴ The underlying logic behind this procedure is the fact that cultural values take time to change, and the aggregate values of indices across the survey waves change at a very slow rate.

Following the exact design created by Welzel in *Freedom Rising*, we used 12 survey questions to measure the four domains of emancipative values and construct the final index.⁶⁵ The 12 items were normalised into a scale ranging from a minimum of 0 for the least emancipative orientation, to a maximum of 1.0, for the most emancipative orientation. Then, the groups of items characterising various domains of emancipative values were averaged to form sub-indices, which were further averaged into the overall index of emancipative values.⁶⁶

Following the precedent of the study of cultural values at national level and research on national values,⁶⁷ we utilised country means of the emancipative values index. To measure the similarity in the emancipative values in state dyads, we subtracted the means of the emancipative values of State A from the means of the emancipative values of State B, and took the absolute value of the difference. The high values on this variable denote greater cultural ‘distance’ between the states in the dyad and, therefore, lower cultural comparability, whereas the low values indicate high cultural similarities within the country dyad.

We opted for subtraction rather than addition of scores on the value variables within dyads for the following reason. According to the cultural similarity argument, it is the cultural similarity/dissimilarity that drives peace/conflict within state dyads. The addition of scores on the value variables would obscure whether the cultural scores were identical within the dyad. The high cultural values formed by summation would denote the overall higher scores on cultural values within the dyad, but not necessarily their similarity. To illustrate this point, a sum of 1 of the normalised value scores for a state dyad may mean two different things: (1) the two states within the dyad have values of 0.5 on the value dimension, which means they are culturally similar; or (2) one may have a score of 0.1 (0.2, 0.3, etc.) and another one – the score of 0.9 (0.9, 0.7, etc.) meaning that they are culturally dissimilar but still have a joint emancipative value score of 1. In other words, the summation would not allow us to determine the extent to what states within dyads are culturally similar or dissimilar. Subsequently, we opted for the subtraction of cultural scores within state dyads to tap more precisely the cultural distance within the state dyad. To offset heteroskedasticity common to time series data, we normalised all variables by logging

⁶³To ensure that the missing observations in our unbalanced panels are missed at random, we executed a Monte Carlo simulation that confirmed this assumption.

⁶⁴This technique was originally developed by Rubin (1987) and Schafer (1997). D. B. Rubin, *Multiple Imputation for Nonresponse in Surveys* (New York, NY: Wiley, 1987); J. L. Schafer, *Analysis of Incomplete Multivariate Data* (Boca Raton, FL: Chapman & Hall/CRC, 1997).

⁶⁵To measure people’s orientation toward *autonomy*, we relied on three items asking respondents to consider whether (1) independence and (2) imagination were desirable child qualities, and (3) obedience was undesirable as such a quality. To measure individuals orientation towards making free *choices*, we used three survey questions asking respondents whether they found (1) divorce; (2) abortion; and (3) homosexuality acceptable. We tap individuals orientation to *equality* through their attitudes toward gender equality measured by three questions asking respondents strongly agree or disagree with the statements that (1) ‘education is more important for a boy than a girl’; (2) ‘when jobs are scarce, men should have priority over women to get a job’; and (3) ‘men makes better political leaders than women’. Finally, to measure individual value of *voice* of the people as a source of influence in their society, we used three items asking respondents to assign first, second, or no priority to the goals of (1) ‘protecting freedom of speech’; (2) ‘giving people more say in important government decisions’; and (3) ‘giving people more say about how things are done at their jobs and in their communities’.

⁶⁶For further discussion of the methodology, see Welzel, *Freedom Rising*, appendix.

⁶⁷Welzel, *Freedom Rising*; Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005).




Figure 2. Mean, minimum, and maximum of emancipative scores by year.




Figure 3. Cultural distances within state dyads by year.

them. It also helped to linearise the elastic relationship between the dependent variable and the logged independent variables.⁶⁸ Figures 2 and 3 present descriptive statistics of the untransformed average emancipative scores and distances within state dyads across years.

In addition to the cultural similarity variable that we use to test the impact of similarities/differences in state dyads on their propensity to engage in militarised disputes, we created a

⁶⁸One of the possible issues with the right-hand side logs in our specified model is the presence of undefined logarithmic observations when the two states within the dyad receive the same scores on a dimension of emancipatory values, thus producing the cultural difference of 'zero' in the state dyad. This issue, however, is not detrimental to our analysis. The decimal numbers on the sub-indices of cultural values have several places past the decimal making the probability of similar values very unlikely. In fact, less than 0.1 per cent of the dyadic observations (200 state dyads out of more than 200,000) result in undefined logarithms in this study. These undefined cases are dropped from our analysis. To ensure that this exclusion does not affect our results we added a 0.1 constant to all of the values of cultural differences in the dyad before taking their natural logs (this resulted in retaining all of the observations) and retested all models. The results received from these tests were identical to those received from a smaller sample.

dummy variable with a value of '1', if both states in the dyad had scores in the 50th percentile of the emancipative values measure, and '0' otherwise. To put it differently, when both states in the dyad had higher than average convictions in the importance of liberty, choice, voice, and equality, the dyad was assigned a value of '1', and '0' otherwise. If the cultural similarity variable is indifferent to highs and lows on emancipative values within the dyad, the dummy variable distinguishes between the pairs of states that share emancipative values and those that share other cultural beliefs. Since emancipative values are comparable with democratic norms, the inclusion of this variable will allow us to test for the impact of normative proposition of the democratic peace theory.

As discussed in the theoretical section, the influence of state similarity and emancipative values on state conduct are intertwined and perceptions of similarity by states with emancipative cultures are not necessary for the emancipative values to exert a limiting impact on these states' warlike conduct. However, these influences would be felt the most in dyads of states sharing these emancipative values and norms. For the cultural similarity argument, perceptions of other states are important. While our measures of culture do not measure perceptions of other states directly, we assume that prevalent cultures provide sufficient informational cues that will enable individuals from other states to make sense of other cultures and form attitudes toward countries they know little about.⁶⁹

Further, cultural values are a property of individuals. Questions, therefore, can arise about whether the mean scores of the individual responses collected from the nationally representative samples provide a valid estimation of value prevalence at the societal level. From the methodological standpoint, the plausibility of this assumption hinges on the qualities of the distribution of responses: if responses from the members of the same state form a normal distribution with a single peak point around the average value-position of all respondents, then there is a real central tendency around which the individual value positions of all members of a society gravitate. The earlier WVS studies showed that national mean scores of emancipative values of all states included into the WVS data meet this requirement.⁷⁰

Dependent and other independent variables

The outcome (dependent) variable in this study is the existence of a militarised interstate dispute (MID) (following the COW criteria), which serves as a proxy for inter-state war for each state dyad coded on an annual basis as (1) if the dyad experienced at least one MID in that year and (0) if it did not. This is also known as 'ongoing MIDs' or 'conflict involvement' for the countries in the dyad. Differences in the terminology reflect two approaches to specifying the dependent variables in the studies of international conflict based on time-series cross-sectional data. The first approach, which is the approach used in this study, is to code every time unit (generally years), in which there is conflict between the states in the dyad. The second approach is to code only the onset of an event as one and set the remaining observations during which conflict continues to a zero value.⁷¹ We include all directed state dyads between years 1981 and 2010. Aware of the problems and limitations in using dyadic modeling (in particular, the temporal dependence of data), we introduced a restricted cubic spline model, further discussed below.⁷²

⁶⁹Hudson, 'Cultural expectations'.

⁷⁰Welzel, *Freedom Rising*, p. 85.

⁷¹D. Scott Bennett and Allan C. Stam III, *The Behavioral Origins of War* (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2004); Allan Dafoe, John R. Oneal, and Bruce Russett, 'The democratic peace: Weighing the evidence and cautious inference', *International Studies Quarterly*, 57 (2013), pp. 201–14.

⁷²Beck, Katz, and Tucker, 'Taking time seriously'; Most of the criticisms of dyadic modeling are not unique to this method but apply to any statistical large-n techniques used in IR. For example, unobserved heterogeneity lurks in virtually any statistical analysis biasing standard errors. We estimate robust standard errors in order to counteract issues of heterogeneity or correlation between unobserved heterogeneity and our key causal variables (Gary King, 'Proper nouns and methodological propriety: Pooling dyads in international relations data', *International Organization*, 55:2 (2001), pp. 497–507).

The democratic peace scholarship has examined countless possible covariates influencing the democratic peace. In an effort to keep our statistical models simple, we chose to focus on the explanatory factors that consistently appear in the democratic peace studies. Thus, other independent variables included in the models are the regime type of the dyad, the contiguity of the states, existing alliances within dyads, relative military capabilities, and the presence or absence of major powers.

Much of the democratic peace research suggests that peace is best explained by the level of 'democraticness' of the dyad as a whole rather than by the individual polity scores of the states that comprise it.⁷³ We echo this finding empirically and follow in the footsteps of our predecessors by including a *joint democracy* variable measured using the standard Polity IV data.⁷⁴ Polity data provide an 11-point 0 to 10 index of a regime type – DEMOC – based on formal constraints on the executive and institutional support for democracy. We compute joint democracy as a dichotomous variable which is coded '1' when both states in the dyad receive Polity scores of six or more and coded '0' otherwise.⁷⁵

GDP is calculated as within dyad difference in per capita GDP.⁷⁶ It is the difference between the higher and lower monadic scores in per capita GDP (another way to define it is population weighted gross domestic product). GDP values are logged. *Contiguity* is a dummy variable that is coded '1' if states within the dyad are land contiguous or separated by less than 12 miles of water and coded '0' if the states are not contiguous. We include a dummy variable that is coded '1' if at least one state in a dyad is one of the five post-Second World War *major powers* (China, France, United States, United Kingdom, and USSR/Russia), and '0' otherwise. To measure relative *capabilities* of states within a dyad, we used the COW military capabilities index composed of the weighted average of a country's share of the system's total population, urban population, energy consumption, iron and steel production, military manpower, and military expenditures.⁷⁷ Capabilities ratio equals the natural log of the ratio of the CINC (Composite Index of National Capability) score. We use a binary indicator to code *alliances* where '1' denotes state dyads linked by a mutual defence treaty, a neutrality or nonaggression pact, or an entente, and 0 if none of these treaties are present. The coding is based on the COW Alliance Dataset.⁷⁸

All models are executed using a random effects logit model. This model accounts for the binary dependent variable, but also allows for varying slope estimates based on each group unit (dyad) observation. All independent variables were lagged by one year.⁷⁹ We used a restricted

⁷³David L. Rousseau, Christopher Gelpi, Dan Reite, and Paul Huth, 'Assessing the dyadic nature of the Democratic Peace, 1918–88', *American Political Science Review*, 90:3 (1996), pp. 512–33; John R. Oneal and Bruce M. Russett, 'The classical liberals were right: Democracy, interdependence, and conflict, 1950–1985', *International Studies Quarterly*, 41:2 (1997), pp. 267–94.

⁷⁴Monty G. Marshall, Ted Robert Gurr, and Keith Jagers, 'Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800–2013', Dataset Users' Manual, Center for Systemic Peace, available at: {<http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/p4manualv2013.pdf>} accessed 1 February 2015.

⁷⁵Stuart A. Bremer, 'Dangerous dyads: Conditions affecting the likelihood of interstate war, 1816–1965', *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 36:2 (1992), pp. 309–41; Henry S. Farber and Joanne Gowa, 'Polities and peace', *International Security*, 20:2 (1995), pp. 123–46; Edward D. Mansfield and Jack L. Snyder, *Electing to Fight: Why Emerging Democracies Go to War* (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2005); Maoz and Russett, 'Normative and structural causes'.

⁷⁶Gartzke, 'The capitalist peace'.

⁷⁷J. David Singer and Melvi Small, 'National Material Capabilities Data, 1816–1992', Correlates of War Project, University of Michigan, Department of Political Science (1995).

⁷⁸Douglas M. Gibling and Meredith Reid Sarkees, 'Measuring alliances: the Correlates of War formal interstate alliance dataset, 1816–2000', *Journal of Peace Research*, 41:2 (2004), pp. 211–22; Melvin Small and J. David Singer, 'Formal alliances, 1816–1965', in J. David Singer and Paul Diehl (ed.), *Measuring the Correlates of War* (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1990), pp. 159–90.

⁷⁹Beck, Katz, and Tucker, 'Taking time seriously'; John R. Oneal and Bruce Russett, 'Clear and clean: the fixed effects of the liberal peace', *International Organization*, 55 (2001), pp. 465–86; Mousseau, 'The democratic peace unraveled'.

cubic spline model in order to flexibly and non-linearly model the onset of war within a dyad of states (our dependent variable) as a function of the specified cultural differences within dyads. This required the use of piecewise cubic polynomials to model observational dependence over time, whose placements were determined based on both the distribution of the data points and on theoretical precedent.⁸⁰ In short, the random effects combined with the cubic spline model loosen the assumption of independence, allowing for flexible modeling of cross-unit and temporal dependence. To examine the independent effects of joint democracy and cultural similarity, we executed models containing these independent variables separately as well as together. To explore links between these two main concepts, we also examined the interaction of these two terms.⁸¹ In keeping with our arguments about the two causal influences of culture on the interstate disputes, we substituted the cultural similarity variable with the joint high emancipative values dummy, used as a proxy for the joint normative democratic peace, in some model specifications.

Results

Table 1 reports the findings of the seven random effect logistic regression analyses testing the impact of cultural similarities and joint democracy within state dyads on militarised dispute between these states. Model 1 includes both cultural similarity and joint democracy variables, while Models 2 and 3 report findings from regressions of militarised disputes on cultural similarity or joint democracy respectively. Model 4 includes an interactive term of cultural similarity and joint democracy. In Model 5, we substitute cultural similarity with the high joint emancipative values variable, while keeping joint democracy, which is excluded in Model 6. The last model (Model 7) includes an interactive term of high joint emancipative values and joint democracy. The appendix (Table A1) reports results in odds ratios that allow for comparison of the effect of variables of interest across models.⁸²

We discussed the conceptual distinction between emancipative values and democratic norms above. Statistically, joint emancipative scores and joint democracy scores are not correlated to cause collinearity in the executed models returning a Pearson's R of 0.01. Among the state dyads with higher than average emancipative values scores, only about 18.2 per cent are jointly democratic dyads.

The cultural similarity variable is positive and statistically significant ($p \leq 0.01$) when appears jointly with the joint democracy variable (Model 1) and by itself (Model 2). A positive coefficient on the cultural similarity variable suggests that a higher 'distance' on the emancipative value scores of the two states in a dyad is associated with a higher propensity for conflict within the dyad. Reversely, a shorter distance on the emancipative values in a state dyad (that is, greater cultural similarity of states in the dyad) is associated with lower likelihood of militarised disputes within this state dyad. Substantively, when cultural 'distance' within a state dyad measured by the difference in aggregate value scores increases by one unit (denoting more dissimilar states), the odds of conflict increase by 21 per cent.

⁸⁰Beck, Katz, and Tucker, 'Taking time seriously'; Charles Boehmer, Erik Gartzke, and Timothy Nordstrom, 'Do international organizations promote peace?', *World Politics*, 57:1 (2004), pp. 1–38; David B. Carter and Curtis S. Signorino, 'Back to the future: Modeling time dependence in binary data', *Social Sciences Political Analysis*, 18:3 (2010), pp. 271–92.

⁸¹Bennett, 'Towards a continuous specification'.

⁸²Stuart R. Lipsitz, Nan M. Laird, and David P. Harrington, 'Generalized estimating equations for correlated binary data: Using the odds ratio as a measure of association', *Biometrika*, 78 (1991), pp. 153–60; C. J. Zorn, 'Generalized estimating equation models for correlated data: a review with applications', *American Journal of Political Science* (2001), pp. 470–90; Jack A. Goldstone, Robert H. Bates, David L. Epstein, Ted R. Gurr, Michael B. Lustik, Monty G. Marshall, Jay Ulfelder, and Mark Woodward, 'A global model for forecasting political instability', *American Journal of Political Science*, 54:1 (2010), pp. 190–208.

Table 1. Random effects logistic regression of dyadic analysis.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
Cultural Similarity	0.187** (0.046)	0.185** (0.048)		0.236** (0.055)			
Joint Democracy	-1.51** (0.123)		-1.55** (0.127)	-2.12** (0.325)	-1.37** (0.124)		-1.17** (0.000)
Cultural Similarity* Joint Democracy				-0.192 (0.112)			
Emancipative values at 50th percentile 50th Percentile* Democracy					-0.33** (0.115)	-0.76** (0.113)	-0.148 (0.135) -0.72** (0.258)
GDP	0.032 (0.0004)	0.095* (0.041)	0.087* (0.038)	0.026 (0.042)	0.077* (0.03)	0.11** (0.03)	0.07 (0.039)
Relative Capabilities	-0.004** (0.001)	-0.004** (0.001)	-0.004** (0.001)	-0.004** (0.001)	-0.004** (0.001)	-0.004** (0.001)	-0.004** (0.001)
Contiguity	7.25** (0.15)	7.6** (0.139)	7.52** (0.146)	7.71** (0.149)	7.23** (0.128)	7.23** (0.124)	7.65** (0.144)
Alliance	0.67** (0.119)	0.522** (0.122)	0.685** (0.123)	0.715** (0.127)	0.659** (0.142)	0.52** (0.137)	0.696** (0.126)
Major Power	3.326** (0.118)	3.316** (0.117)	3.46** (0.12)	3.55** (0.123)	3.38** (0.139)	3.30** (0.132)	3.61** (0.123)
Spline 1	-0.029 (0.025)	-0.023 (0.-26)	-0.049 (0.026)	-0.031 (0.026)	-0.05* (0.026)	-0.047 (0.025)	-0.052* (0.026)
Spline 2	0.137 (0.078)	0.103 (0.081)	0.187* (0.08)	0.147 (0.083)	0.189* (0.081)	0.162* (0.079)	0.194* (0.082)
Spline 3	-0.65** (0.23)	-0.579** (0.238)	-0.795** (0.24)	-0.699** (0.243)	-0.785** (0.234)	-0.71** (0.231)	-0.81** (0.241)
Constant	45.06 (50.00)	32.07 (51.6)	84.27 (51.13)	48.96 (52.93)	87.2 (50.64)	-92.68 (119.79)	89.94 (51.86)
Rho	0.826 (0.006)	0.842 (0.005)	0.84 (0.005)	0.847 (0.005)	0.826 (0.004)	0.826 (0.004)	0.846 (0.004)
Wald Chi²	3168.11	4310.70	3788.87	3922.72	9986.5	9928.5	4150.9
Prob Chi²	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Number Obs.	515,220	515,220	519,138	515,220	519,138	519,138	519,138
Number Groups	513,984	513,984	517,902	513,984	517,902	517,902	517,902

Note: * $p \leq 0.05$ ** $p \leq 0.01$

The introduction of the cultural similarity variable did not vitiate the impact of joint democracy on conflict within the dyads of states. The joint democracy variable returned negative and significant coefficients suggesting that two democracies are less likely to experience a militarised dispute than other pairs of states. Substantively, a jointly democratic dyad has an 81.8 per cent decrease in odds of experiencing conflict over non-jointly democratic dyads. This is reflected in Model 3, where joint democracy appears by itself, returning a statistically significant effect ($p \leq 0.01$) in an expected direction demonstrating the ability of this model to reproduce the main findings of the democratic peace thesis, namely, jointly democratic dyads are less likely to go to war. The inclusion of an interactive ‘cultural similarity/joint democracy’ term did not wash out the independent impacts of both cultural similarity and joint democracy (Model 4). The interactive term appears to be in the expected direction suggesting that even in the dyads of democratic states, increased cultural difference makes conflict more likely. However, the interactive term did not reach a conventional level of statistical significance ($p \leq 0.05$).

The high emancipative value scores dummy returned statistically significant coefficients ($p \leq 0.01$) in the expected direction in Models 5 and 6. Dyads where both states are in the 50th percentile for emancipatory scores experience between a 28.1 and 53 per cent decrease in the odds of experiencing MID in Models 5 and 6, respectively. Similarly to Model 1, the impact of high emancipative value scores in state dyads does not wash out the impact of the joint

democracy variable. Jointly democratic dyads have 74.7 per cent decreased odds of experiencing conflict over non-democratic dyads (Model 5).

In Model 7 containing an interaction term, the direct impact of the high emancipative values becomes insignificant, while joint democracy retains its significant impact. Everything else held constant, jointly democratic dyads have 68.8 per cent decrease in odds of experiencing conflict over non-jointly democratic dyads. The interaction term is significant as well ($p \leq 0.01$) and demonstrates an additional normative impact of emancipative values on joint democracies. Democratic states, which share high emancipative values, have 51 per cent decreased odds of experiencing conflict over non-democratic states that do not share emancipative culture.

Concerns with multicollinearity affecting the results in models with interactive terms are common. One of the possible 'tests' for multicollinearity in logistic regression involves the generation of restricted and full models. This is precisely the strategy that we followed in this study: in Models 1, 2, 3, 5, and 6 we added in one variable of interest at a time and then tested the models with the interaction terms watching for major changes in standard errors. We observed virtually no change in standard errors in either Model 4 or Model 7.⁸³ An interactive term in Model 4 returned an insignificant coefficient suggesting that state dyads that are culturally similar and democratic are no more or less likely to go to war than dyads that are culturally dissimilar and democratic, or culturally similar and non-democratic. However, two states that are democratic and score above the average on emancipative values are considerably less likely to engage in militarised disputes, holding other variables constant.

Among the control variables, contiguity, alliances, and major powers returned positive and statistically significant results ($p \leq 0.01$) consistent with the findings of the democratic peace thesis. State dyads that are contiguous are more likely to experience a MID, as are allied dyads, and dyads in which at least one of the states is a major power. More specifically, using Model 1 as a reference, states that are contiguous are almost 99 per cent more likely to experience a MID than dyads in which the states are not contiguous. An impact of capabilities' differential is small but highly significant: a one unit increase in the ratio of capabilities of the larger state to the smaller state decreases the odds of war 0.4 per cent, everything else being equal. State dyads with treaties experience a 95 per cent increase in odds of experiencing conflict over states where no treaties exist (Model 1). While this finding contradicts earlier research in democratic peace, it echoes more recent scholarship that suggests states, specifically democratic ones, are more likely to violate the terms of alliance agreements because the costs of maintaining alliances become high as power dynamics shift.⁸⁴ In addition, these results echoes the findings suggesting that democracies are more likely to form alliances with highly autocratic regimes than with other democracies, which, if we assume the validity of democratic peace, that higher frequency of democratic-autocratic alliances would suggest a negative relationship between the existence of an alliance within a dyad as these two regime types are more likely to go to war with one another.⁸⁵

⁸³In the end, however, the presence of multicollinearity does not pose a problem for the interpretation of results. It does not distort the variables' coefficients in the interactive model. Any change that takes place in the interactive models is due to the fact that they describe 'conditional relationships rather than general relationships'. R. J. Friedrich, 'In defense of multiplicative terms in multiple regression equations', *American Journal of Political Science*, 26:4 (1982), pp. 797–833.

⁸⁴Brett Ashley Leeds, 'Alliance reliability in time of war: Explaining state decisions to violate treaties', *International Organization*, 57:4 (2003), pp. 801–27.

⁸⁵Michael W. Simon and Erik Gartzke, 'Political system similarity and the choice of allies: Do democracies flock together, or do opposites attract?', *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 40:4 (1996), pp. 617–35; Douglas M. Gibler and Scott Wolford, 'Alliances, then democracy: an examination of the relationship between regime type and alliance formation', *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 50:1 (2006), pp. 129–53.

Discussion and conclusion

This study was motivated by an ongoing debate over the sources of inter-democratic peace. Our contributions to the extant democratic peace scholarship lie first in examining whether shared cultural values conceptualised as emancipative orientations of people toward autonomy, freedom, choice, and voice mitigate conflict within state dyads. Second, we explored whether the impact of joint democracy is sustained if we control for cultural similarities and differences in state dyads. The findings of our analysis add support to the conclusions of the two trends of earlier research on democratic peace: one highlighting the importance of liberal ideology and culture for inter-democratic peace, and another one pointing out the impact of political and cultural similarities within state dyads on the propensity of war state dyads.

We were able to reproduce the results of the Democratic Peace scholarship supporting the pacifying impact of democracy on inter-state relations. However, the cultural similarity variable retained its significance when included into the model alongside the joint democracy variable, and after the removal of joint democracy indicating that it does not falsely represent significance that should be attributed to the democracy score. To explicate the effect of cultural similarity and differences on inter-state relations, consider the Greek-Turkish rivalry, one of the oldest enduring conflicts between neighbours worldwide. In July 1974, this rivalry triggered Turkey's intervention of Cyprus in response to a coup staged by the military Junta in Greece. Although, the Republic of Cyprus saw the restoration of democratic order the same month, Turkey launched another invasion in August 1974 capturing about 40 per cent of Cyprus territory. Turkey had a new democratic government elected in 1973 (POLITY score of 9 during 1973–9), while Cyprus was a constitutional democracy (POLITY score of 10 since 1974). Turkey, however, perceived Greece and Greek Cypriots as the 'other', and this out-group classification of Turkey and Turkish Cypriots was shared by Greek Cypriots and Greece. While representing an oversimplification of a complex history of inter-ethnic relations between Turkish and Greek Cypriots and inter-state relations between Turkey and Greece, the perceived 'otherness' rooted in differences in religion, language, and lifestyle that were deployed in the nationalist rhetoric and historical narratives of the parties of the conflict contributed to antagonisms between Turkey and Greece. Recall that emancipative values capture cross-national cultural differences as evinced in Turkey's emancipative score of 0.35 and Cyprus's of 0.44.⁸⁶

Formal cultural similarity, however, may not suffice to prevent militarised disputes in similar dyads. The Maritime Southeast Asia comprised of several democratic states, including India (the Andaman and Nicobar Islands), Indonesia, East Malaysia, and Philippines, among others, has been mired in low-intensity conflict. Since 2014, Indonesia blew up, sank, or destroyed over three hundred fishing boats from Philippines, Vietnam, and Malaysia in an effort to root out poaching.⁸⁷ Ecuador and Peru, also culturally similar and democratic, fought a brief sequel of the Paquisha war in 1995. Therefore, it is not only the formal similarity that matters in reducing inter-state violence, but also the content of values shared by states. We found that the prevalence of higher than average emancipative values reduces the changes of MID by 42 per cent even when controlling for democracy, which reduces the probability of MID by 0.2. The main effects of the high emancipative value scores, however, was washed out in the interaction model suggesting that a conditional effect of high emancipative scores on democracy: state dyads that are democratic and that share emancipative values they have a lower probability for conflict than jointly democratic states.

⁸⁶Alexis Heraclides, 'The Essence of the Greek-Turkish Rivalry: National Narrative and Identity', GreeSE Paper No. 51 (2011), pp. 1–36; Dimitris Triantaphyllou, 'Greek-Turkish Relations and the Perceptions of their Elites', The London School of Economics and Political Science, available at: <http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/greeceatlse/2017/01/31/greek-turkish-relations-and-the-perceptions-of-their-elites/> accessed 21 July 2018.

⁸⁷Francis Chan, 'Indonesia blows up and sinks another 81 fishing boats for poaching', *The Straits Times* (2 April 2017), available at: <https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/indonesia-blows-up-and-sinks-another-81-fishing-boats-for-poaching> accessed 21 July 2018.

The Croatia-Slovenia border conflict discussed above fits this pattern well. During the 1990s, when Slovenia established a multi-party representative democracy (POLITY democracy score of 10 since 1991) while Croatia's democratisation was delayed (POLITY democracy scores of 0 and 1 between 1991 and 1999), the two countries avoided militarisation of their border dispute. The people of both nations shared predispositions toward autonomy, freedom, choice, and voice captured by higher than average emancipative value scores (Croatia = 0.5; Slovenia = 0.54). The more prosperous republics of the former Yugoslavia with higher standards of living, these two nations were among the first to express their support for decentralisation and democracy in the Yugoslavia, and, later, declare their independence from the union.⁸⁸

The democratic peace theory has come to have real-world implications. Citing the joint democratic peace proposition, policymakers in the US and other democratic states have drawn a link between their states' security and the spread of democracy, which has led in turn to the democracy promotion crusade. Democracy promotion strategies, however, have zeroed in on the competitive political process and accountable and transparent government as the primary dimensions of democratisation as opposed to the deeper attitudinal and cultural transformation of the democratised societies.⁸⁹

As demonstrated in this study, political structures are shaped and sustained by the underlying cultural values. Meaningful democracy would not emerge and survive without the spread of predispositions toward autonomy, freedom, choice, and voice in the society. Whether or not newly democratised states stay on the democratic path or regress to authoritarianism, and whether or not they resort to force for resolving disputes with the fellow democracies largely depends on how prevalent the emancipative values are in their societies. The prevalence of emancipative values suggests a possibility for 'monadic' democratic peace, whereby countries embracing these value spurn violence as incompatible with humanistic ideals recognising humanity and inimical to their ability to engaging life's rising opportunities. As a result of the latter, 'people's valuation of life changes profoundly: readiness to sacrifice one's life gives way to an increasing insistence on living it'.⁹⁰

If it is the specific aspects of culture, particularly the values of autonomy, freedom, voice, and choice, rather than democracy, that is an antidote for future wars, it calls for a different set of policy tools and programmes of actions. The rejection of violence can be directly addressed by the educational base and is implicit in furthering human rights and gender equality. The prevention of conflict by tackling root causes can be addressed through sustainable development, among other things. Education and open communication can work together to begin solving problems through negotiation and dialogue.⁹¹

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⁸⁸Jović, *Yugoslavia*.

⁸⁹Mariya Omelicheva, *Democracy in Central Asia? Competing Perspectives and Alternative Strategies* (Lexington, KY: The University Press of Kentucky, 2014).

⁹⁰Inglehart, Puranen, and Welzel, 'Declining willingness to fight for one's country'.

⁹¹UNESCO, *UNESCO and a Culture of Peace: Promoting a Global Movement* (New York: United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization, 1995).

Appendix

Table A1. Odds ratios of random effects logistic regression of dyadic analysis.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
Cultural Similarity	1.21** (0.055)	1.20** (0.058)		1.27** (0.069)			
Joint Democracy	0.222** (0.027)		0.212** (0.027)	0.121** (0.039)	0.253** (0.032)		0.312** (0.052)
Cultural Similarity* Joint Democracy				0.825 (0.09)			
Emancipative values at 50th percentile					0.719** (0.081)	0.47** (0.05)	0.86 (0.117)
50th Percentile* Democracy							0.49** (0.126)
GDP	1.03 (0.041)	1.1* (0.04)	1.09* (0.041)	1.03 (0.043)	1.08* (0.04)	1.11** (0.04)	1.1 (0.041)
Relative Capabilities	0.996** (0.001)	0.996** (0.001)	0.996** (0.001)	0.996** (0.001)	0.996** (0.001)	0.996** (0.001)	0.996** (0.001)
Contiguity	1407.8** (210.82)	1996.9** (276.8)	1839.0** (268.8)	2226.1** (331.0)	1376.7** (203.5)	1373.5** (195.0)	2106** (303.6)
Alliance	1.95** (0.231)	1.69** (0.21)	1.984** (0.245)	2.05** (0.259)	0.659** (0.142)	1.69** (0.2)	2.0** (0.25)
Major Power	27.82** (3.28)	27.5** (3.21)	31.95** (3.84)	33.84** (4.27)	1.93** (0.229)	27.23** (3.18)	37.13** (4.57)
Spline 1	0.971 (0.024)	0.98 (0.025)	0.95 (0.025)	0.969 (0.026)	0.95* (0.023)	0.954 (0.024)	0.949* (0.022)
Spline 2	1.15 (0.09)	1.11 (0.09)	1.21* (0.10)	1.16 (0.096)	1.21* (0.094)	1.18* (0.09)	1.21* (0.099)
Spline 3	0.519** (0.119)	0.56* (0.133)	0.451** (0.11)	0.497** (0.121)	0.456** (0.104)	0.49** (0.11)	0.44** (0.11)
Constant	3.73e+19 (1.86e+2)	8.44e+13 (4.36e+2)	3.99e+36 (2.04e+38)	1.83e+21 (9.68e+22)	7.42e+37 (3.67e+39)	9.90e+34 (4.313+36)	1.15e+39 (5.96e+40)
Rho	0.826 (0.006)	0.842 (0.005)	0.84 (0.005)	0.847 (0.005)	0.826 (0.004)	0.826 (0.004)	0.846 (0.004)
Wald Chi²	3168.11	4310.70	3788.87	3922.72	9986.5	9928.5	4150.9
Prob Chi²	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Number Obs.	515,220	515,220	519,138	515,220	519,138	519,138	519,138
Number Groups	513,984	513,984	517,902	513,984	517,902	517,902	517,902

Note: *p ≤ 0.05 **p ≤ 0.01